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ABSTRACT

The Castillo de San Fernando de Omoas
The History of a Fiasco
by
Jamee L. Zackrison

The concept behind the fort of San Fernando de Omoa grew
from the unrest

caused by pirates along the coasts of

Central America in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The poor

condition of the Caribbean defenses resulted partly because
Spain did not know how to deal with the pirates.

The

latter did not have very much strength, and changed tactics
as

often

as

the

Spaniards

did.

Several

military

strategists, including the Count of Aranda, Juan Bautista
Antonelli,

and apparently,

Luis D!ez Navarro,

recommended

forts--in the case of this study, San Fernando de Omoa--to
serve as bases and safe ports from which fleets might seek
out and fight aggressively against the pirates, and later
the British Navy.

But

the Spanish

paternalistic and parsimonious theories,

Crown,

with

its

did not follow a

consistent plan during the construction of the system,
ended by arming and manning Omoa defensivelys

and

no fleet

ever complemented the defense of the fort.

For that reason

Omoa fell at the first attempt by an enemy to

take it.

This study explains the background to this specific
case of Omoa, then provides a chronological overview of the
construction period.
value,

it

mentions

construction

Besides an analysis of
the

period,

strategic

commercial activity during the

and

analyses

any

influence

this

activity could have had on the planning and construction
and eventual use of the fort.

A chapter is devoted to the

use of Indian and black slave labor during the construction
period.
Materials found especially useful during the research
include the Annual Register,
La Sierra Campus library;

in the Loma Linda University,
the unpublished "Historia" of

Rubio Sanchez at the Academia de Geografia e Historia de
Guatemala which the author so graciously made available
from his personal library;

Manuel Zapatero's Organization

of American States-funded technical assessment of the fort,
found in the Instituto de Geografia e Historia in Honduras
(IHAH);
Reyes,

the

long and enjoyable chats

research director at IHAH;

on the Indian labor at

with

Victor Cruz

Mario Argueta's article

the fort,

in the Universidad

Nacional Aut6noma de Honduras library; and finally,
to photograph the fort itself.
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Chapter One:

The Colonial Background

The reign of Carlos I
in Spain:

witnessed an awkward situation

increasing expansion into an unprecedented type

of colonialism left Spain weak yet eager.

With its economy

bolstered by the increasing influx of gold and silver from
the colonies,

Spain had overextended both in manpower and

expenditures far beyond its capacity to keep up.

Though

increased in power and prestige in Europe, her enemies-England,

France,

colonies

in

Europe.

an

and

Holland--struck

attempt

to

weaken

at

the

Spain's

And strike they did with a vengeance:

American

position

by the mid-

1500's pirates had attacked and looted Puerto
Cartagena de

Indias,

Havana,

Santiago de Cuba,

Spanish Main at least once each.
came from

in

Rico,

and

the

The biggest difficulty

incursions in the Caribbean:

privateers and

buccaneers dominated the Gulf of Mexico for approximately

twenty years,

from

1665 to 1685,

during which time no

seaport had any safety from their pillaging. 1
Defending the Panamanian isthmus posed a particularly
grave problem.

The existing defensive system included

forts at Portobelo,
in the north;
coast,

Santiago,

San Felipe,

and San Geronimo

Chagres had a small garrison.

On the south

only Panama City had any fortification,

small rampart at Chep6 could be counted.

unless a

Only 790

men

2

defended the strip of land over which the wealth of the
Incas passed on its way to Spain.2
English privateers and buccaneers, whether under royal
license or not,
Mary

Tudor's

began raiding the Spanish Caribbean during
reign,

but

their tripe

increased when

Elizabeth took over, as she did not restrict them.

During

the early years, most pirate bands worked alone, using one
vessel to

fight from, though they usually took along an

oared pinnace, in case they were becalmed.3

But after

1552, pirates began joining together in small squadrons.
At first they had worked as legitimate traders, but after
hearing how Spain treated John Hawkins,

many decided that

piracy would be the only profitable trade in the Caribbean.
Spain, following its policy of total dominion, defined as a
pirate anyone sailing in the Caribbean without a license,
and treated them as such.

Carlos II, on November 14, 1690,

issued a Royal Decree ordering all captured pirate officers
(corporal
pirates

through

of no

rank

captain)
would

summarily

hung.

be sentenced to

Enlisted

life in the

galleys.ll
Roland Hussey points out that Spain could not stop
these pirates, but because the pillage of small American
towns did not at any time hurt the economy of the Iberian
Peninsula, not much had been done about the problem.5
later years

In

the situation became so bad that Governor

Francisco de Parga of Honduras could not safely

approach

3

the north shores of his province--even with the company of
150

soldiers.6
To all appearances, Elizabeth I could not stop

the English pirates either, though she actually may have
encouraged--and sponsored--some of them.

But Felipe II

allowed himself to be fooled by appearances, and decided
that diplomatic pressure--not aggressive warfare--provided
the best policy.

That may be why he insisted private

investors finance any military buildup in the Caribbean.
He did send the Conde de Feria to the English government to
protest--unsuccessfully--Henry Stranke's and William
Willfort's

atrocities.

F e r nan d e z

shortly after this protest,

A1 var e z

s t at e s

t ha t

Elizabeth armed over 300 ships

to combat future crime of this sort--though the Spanish
believed

they

sailed for

more piracy.7 Then in

1561 a

British squadron did equip to counter buccaneering, and
Elizabeth ordered all merchant ships to disarm.

Felipe

II's policy of diplomacy seemed to be working.
The pirates did not alone profit from Spain's chaotic
defense policies.

The British government entered the scene

also: as early as 1665 Oliver Cromwell sent an expedition
to the Caribbean which,

though badly defeated at Santo

Domingo, successfully captured Jamaica.
retaliate,

Spain, too weak to

allowed Jamaica to remain in British hands,

after several half-hearted forays

to retake it failed.

4

This expedition of Cromwell's formed part ot his "Western
Design" to take over Panama and the rest or Central America
in an effort to strangle Spain's hold on America.

The plan

never materialized further than the one expedition to
Jamaica, but this toe-hold provided an unforseen resulti
in

1667 Spain signed a

treaty

friendship and agreeing to accept
Three years

ports or America.

in

Madrid,

~ritish

later,

pledging

trade in certain
in an even more

significant e.greement--the Second Treaty of Madrid--Spain
recognized the right or countries other than itself and
Portugal to colonize America..

Britain could legally keep

its positions in the Caribbean and on the North American
oontinent--which it had all intentions of doing anyway.
Recognizing its holdings as something worth maintaining,
Britain began building up these settlements, especially
Jamaica and the Belize logwood cutting camps. 8
The conquest or Jamaica gave the British forces an
excellent base for buccaneering in the Caribbean.

Belize

became the next base, though it had been occupied for many
years previously:

woodcutters had already taken over what

they called "Campeaohy" in 1659, and eleven years later
Spain finally acknowledged their right to work in the area,
after trying many times to dislodge the intruders.

In the

1680s, the British .lost all but a small area in Belize to
armed Spanish colonists,
Spain never really

though they had entrenched well.

accepted the

woodcutters' right

to

5

remain,

though these, and the British Crown, adamantl7

insisted on its
in 1784, a commission from the Crown or Spain
was authorized "to make a formal deliver7 to
the British nation or the lands allotted for
the cutting of logwood, &c." It is necessary
to state this explicitly, because many persons
are not only ignorant whether Honduras is an
island or part of the continent, but very many,
who are aware or the position of the
settlements, think the British have merely a
right to the logwood and mahogany cutting in
the Bay or Honduras, and that it is not a
territorial occupancy of the British Crown,
wh i ch , in fa c t , i t i a , a s m u o h as J a ma i ca or
any other settlement. 9
Because or the nature of the Spanish conquest, the
north coast of Central America--having no great apparent
mineral

wealth--received

sparse

consequently remained unprotected.

settlement,

and

Several British groups

attempted to take advantage of this.

One of the most

formal, if lea.st suooessrul, came to be known as William
Patterson's New Caledonia colony or Darien, in 1698.

Two

years after its demise, Governor Draz Pimienta of Cartagena
dislodged a. second attempt by the British to colonize the
Da.ridn area. 1 O
Some fortification seemed necessary to the Spaniards,
but

on the whole this remained inadequate,

British,

and

inhabit.

In 1643 Trujillo fell to Dutch pirates, though it

had a

French corsairs

made

and Dutch,

the area unsafe

to

small fort with 17 heavy guns and several smaller

piecea. 11

Spanish settlers began asking Spain to send

military governors to the Audiencias,
defense of the colonies.
daily

occurrences

to help with the

They did not like the almost

involving

foreign

pirates.

Spanish

authorities objected to Eritish encroachments and sent both
armies and ships when colonists and woodcutters alike
appealed to their respective governments for aid.
Vazquez de Prego,

Don Jose

Captain-general of Guatemala in 1752,

issued several successful orders to force the British to
evacuate their settlements in Belize.

During the next few

years the woodcutters lost all but a couple of positions,
1 i k e t h e f o r t a. t P o ya. , o n R:! o T i n t o • 1 2
The Peace of Paris, signed on February 10, 1763, gave
~rite.in

the right to maintain logwood camps in return for

an agreement to demolish any fortifications built in the

disputed

areas.

settlements,

Spain agreed

allowing the

magazines (warehouses). 1 3

to not disturb these

baymen

to

build

houses

and

Britain subscribed to a foreign

policy dictating that any attack on a Spanish colony really
did . not mean enmity with Spain, 1 ~ though they realized the
point could not be pushedt

the baymen were ordered to

destroy their forts and lay no permanent claim on the land.

Eut Spanish colonists could not be so easily satisfied-they

realized

the English had never given up their

intentions and claims on Valis (Belize), and so continued

to harass the woodouttera.15

7

Spain needed a system of defense to solve the problem,
if only to calm its
question of how

to

citizens

establish

in
one

the

colonies.

divided

The

military

and

civilian theorists into two schools of thought:

those for

aggressive,

defensive

warfare.
supply

open warfare,

and those for passive,

The former advocated a line of forts to arm and
a

navy

to

sail

and

destroying their base ports.

search

out

the

pirates,

They recognized in

their

enemies not an organized force with one headquarters and
leader, but rather a disjointed bunch of individuals with
one purpose.

A defensive posture

would only treat

symptoms, preventing attacks at specific locations.

the

But an

aggressive posture could eliminate the danger of any attack
by destroying the pirates before they could do any damage.
The

second

dangerous,

school

of

thought

saw

such

a

theory

as

for it left the coasts basically undefended:

who would protect the cities while the navy put to sea?
After all,

were one pirate under attack, no other would go

to his rescue, but rather would seize the chance to pillage
some other undefended Spanish towns.

A superior system

would be to fortify all major ports and allow trade only
through them.

This theory became more popular among the

colonists,

who preferred to see physical evidence of their

defense.

It

colonists

is

also

possible

could "keep tabs"

that

on the

in

this

way

Spanish navy,

the

while

dealing on the side with the same pirates and smugglers

8

they were supposed to be fighting. 1 6
theories arose a

Out of these two

series of fortifications

to improve both

Spain's claim to the area, and to defend the coasts from
British incursions.

Chapter Two:

Peru's Viceroy,

The Guatemalan Background

the Duke of the Palata, saw control of

the pirates as essentially a naval problem.

His theory of

aggressive defense played a. significant part later in the
conception of the fort at Omoa,
resulted when he first
Conde

de

Lemos

also

though nothing but discord

expressed it.

foresaw

In 1667,

aggressive

Viceroy

action

in

the

Caribbean as the solution to the increasingly frequent a.eta
of piracy in the Pacific.

Unfortunately the king,

although .

listening to Lemos' report, did nothing, ostensibly because
he lacked funds. 1
The

President

of

the

Guatemalan

Audiencia,

in

compliance with Royal policy, asked all merchants to defend
the Golfo Dulce,
own expense.
pa.id

taxes

Santo Toms,

and Puerto Caballos at their

The merchants refused,
for

thati

the

defenses for their wares.

King

must

provide

adequate

Taxes went to support the Armada

de Barlovento, the Windward Navy,
(fleet) in the Caribbean.

claiming they already

which defended the flota

In 1633 the King ordered that

fleet to drop its Honduras squadron:

all Central American

trade had to go through Veracruz, in Mexico.
The merchants of Guatemala, upon seeing the
King's orders, must have calculated, as
ob s e r v e s Gar oi a Pe 18. e z , t hat i f th e Ki n g • s
money was not safe on his own ships or in his
ports, neither would their merchandise be; and
it would be better, to avoid risks, to follow
9

10

the road used by the royal couriers.
Thus,
the7 resolved to use the long overland road
between Veracruz and Guatemala for their
oommerce. 2
Spanish convoys, by law, had to be accompanied by two
armed warships.

But even when obeying this

law,

the

merchants loaded the warships with so many goods that their
fighting ability decreased drastically.

In the seventeenth

century Spain did not have a large enough navy to defend
Central Amerioa--or any of the rest of the oolonies, for
that matter.

Every merchant ship could be pressed into

military service, however, by merely placing one or two
cannon on board with the officers to use them.

Thus, the

king saw no real need for a permanent royal navy.3
fact that few

The

ships carried armament or that the · king

provided none seems to have been ignored or overlooked.
Prestige did not provide protection from pirates, though
some Spanish courtiers apparently thought so.

The truth,

as Fernandez Alvarez states, was quite the opposites
The Spanish crown did not possess an
Armada--an organized group of ships--to defend
its oceanic routes from asaaults by its
adversaries, or to attack its enemies when
needed, that was as representative 0£ its power
on the h!gh seas as its permanent armies were
on land.
European nations saw in America the possibility of
enriching their positions vis-a-vis other nations.

Eut

because Spain and Portugal held a virtual ownership
monopoly, it became difficult for them to get a foothold in

II

America.
land,

Spain could fight off imperialist competitors on

but

result,

remained

the

woefully

Council of the

inadequate at
Indies

sea.

developed

As

a

the flota

system--the oonvo7--to send all trade in one 7earl7 or biyearly fleet.

To deal with this new system, pirates also

changed tactics, attacking land positions to get at the
merchandise in the warehouses.

They also struck at single

ships in a harbor after the fleet had split up, if only to
ease their loading operations.
Frequent wars in Europe left the coasts of Central
America open to
manpower

the

supply.

corsairs· attacks
As

no

regular

b7 draining

troops

guarded

the
the

colonies, haoendados (landowners) had to foot the bill for
raising an army.
all people living

On October

7, 1570, King Charles ordered

near seaports in the Americas to have

weapons and horses ready,

according to their abilities,

defend the area if enemies
exempted from this duty,

appeared.

No one

to

could be

and the Viceroys or Presidents had

to review these conditions every four months.5

All weapons

had to be registered and licensed with the Council before

'

being transported to the coloniess

if found otherwise,

they would be confiscated and returned to Spain.6
The king responded to a

164~

petition for a fort on the

north coast of Central America by requesting the name of a
bay and a
funding.

budget proposal

stating the

source of the

No royal monies could be used for the project:

12

The defense of the country was given completely
over to the care 0£ private parties. Without
soldiers, without arms, without supplies,
without military leaders, what is strange is
that Spain should have preserved this colon7,
which had at a ver7 short distance from its
north coasts, wily, ambitious enemies, used to
war and to whom it would have cost very little
to take them over.7
When the pirates changed tactics from the open seas to
land positions, King Felipe II decided to build a system of
defensive forts to protect principal ports.

Only ports

with cities or towns needed fortification at first,

though

Felipe had in mind defending all ports that might be useful
to the pirates. 8

With this in mind, the Crown dispatched

Flores de ValMs' squadron to the Straights of Magellan in
15 81.

Five years later Maestre de Campo Juan de Tejeda

went to the Caribbean to fortify Panama and defend the
transit trade from Peru.
The problem did not appear to be the inability of the
Spaniards to fight off piratess
many times.

they had shown bravery

In 1578 John Oxenham looted Panama but lost

his spoils to a hastily-assembled Panamanian army;

in 1585

Francis Drake attempted unsuccessfully to take Cartagena;
in 1595 Drake again lost a battle,

this time to the

defenders of the fort at San Juan de Puerto Rico;

Sir

Thomas Baskerville met with defeat halfway across the
Panamanian isthmus that same year.9
most problemas

Administrators created

when the Crown did send funds, they were

spent on shady deals, contra.band speculation, and various

13

capricious follies.

These abuses proved very difficult to

remedy. 10
In an attempt to override many problems, Juan Bautista.
Antonelli, a military engineer,

went to inspect the

Caribbean defenses, returning to Spa.in in 1587.

Together

with Tiburcio Hispanoqui, the king's chief engineer, he
drew up a new system based on the passive defense theory-very popular in military circles at the time--calling for
forts

at Ha.bans.,

Portobello. 11

Sa.n Juan de Ulua.,

Puerto Rico,

and

By 1675 most usable harbors in the Caribbean

housed some kind of fort,

though these ha.d been built

ma.inly by private

capital and

private interests.

They had been built for the most part

against attacks by Indians:
Domingo.

their

design

reflected

for instance, the one at Santo

Several did not even face the sea, and no effort

ha.d been made to coordinate the defense system.

The forts

protected trading centers only.
Antonelli's line of f 'orts eventually grew to stretch
all a.long the Spanish Main and along the Caribbean coast to
F 1 o r i d a.
Pet~n

In Cen t r a 1 Ame r i ca and t h e Yu c a tan , i t i n c 1 u d e d

Itza, San Felipe de Ba.calar, San Felipe del Golfo

Dulce,

Sa.n

Fernando

de

Omoa,

Trujillo,

Inmaculada

Concepci6n on the Rio Tinto, Inmacula.da. Concepci6n on the
Rio San Juan, and San Fernando de Ma.tina.. 12

Other forts

included San Marcos de Apalache, San Agustin de la Florida,

14

I

•

Antonelli's fortification system

1.
2.

3.
4.
5~

6.
7.
8.
9.

#
Peten
Itza"
San Felipe de Bacalar
San Felipe del Golfo Dulce
Bustamante de Santo Tomas
San Fernando de Omoa
Inmaculada Concepcitn del R{o Tinto
Inmaculada Concepci6n del R{o San Juan
San Fernando de Matina
Trujillo

15

Panzacola, Nueva Orleans, Luisiana Espanola, San Juan de
Ulua

on

Carmen,

the

island

of

and Campeche.

Sacrificios
Castilla

(or

Gallegos),

Del

del Oro and Nueva Granada

had their own series of fortifications. 1 3
The history of fortification in the northern Spanish
colonies can be divided into three main time periods.

The

first began during the reign of Felipe I I (1556 to 1598),
with the decision to organize the defense of the colonies
under one master plan.
initiative.

Defense no longer depended on local

The decision concerning which port to fortify

(a decision usually made quite correctly) proved so easy to
make,

that even after thirty years the system survived,

though poor construction or management caused some defeats
at the hands of pirates.

The second period comprised the

reign of Felipe IV (1621 to 1665):

Spain had lost much of

its energy by then, and the system's inherent security no
longer

remained.

existing forts,
have been.
century.

Only

in

occurred on

The last time division came in the eighteenth
longer seriously or

European nations did,

imminent invasion of the
Britain

improvements

and then not as efficiently as they should

Pirates no

threatened:

minor

particular

constantly

and Spain feared an

colonies by its imperial rivals.
posed

a

strong

threat,

but

the

excellence of the initial defensive structure did manage to
keep the colonies intaot.14

16

Martin

Carlos

de

Mancos

became

the first

military

President 0£ the Guatemalan Kingdom in 1659 and his task
included improving the defenses along the north coasts of
Central

America.

The British Nav1 had taken

over

the

corsairs' harassment of the Spanish colonists, so Mancos
began construction or the fort on the San Juan river in
Nicaragua,

to prevent an attack on Granada like the one

that came in 1665.

He instituted the practice of taxing

local agricultural products to finance the projects of
defense. 1 5
But

the

Department
budget.

whole

system

of Defense

remained very confusingJ

existed in Spain,

no

and hence,

no

The king dictated all orders, causing at times

serious problems,

especially in timing.

During a war, for

instance, the captain-general became commanding officer,
but he remained answerable to the king. 1 6

The pirates

themselves caused most of the confusion over authority,

a

way,

because

they

collective strength.
problem
visible.

to

the

simply

did

not

have

very

in

much

Piracy had not become an obvious

Spanish

court,

Complaints abounded,

Spain's prosperity directly.

or at

least

one

easily

but these did not affect

The royal engineer Antonelli

wrote to the King thats
the enemy has not yet attacked armed ports, but
only open, poorly defended bays. To do so they
would need larger siege equtfment than is
allowed by the la7 of the land.

17

The colonists needed education, not forts.

Teaching

them how to use artillery and other war equipment would
have been of immense value.

After Drake's attacks in

Central America between 1585 and 1590, the colonists had
begun to lose their faith in forts, or at least in Spain's
ability to defend them.

Talking of the people, Juan de

Tejeda wrote to the king:
We have been advised not to depend on them even
for the construction of a fort, or to defend it
when completed;
they only think about fleeing
to the bush when an attack comes.
Because of
this, then, it is not surprising to recommend
to the Council of the .Indies that the leading
authority of the island [Santo DomingoJ be a
man of arms, and not of letters. 18
Jorge Juan wrote to the king in 1786 that all towns
not under the protection of a fort had to defend themselves
with volunteer militias.

In this manner the crown could

defend large areas of land without any expense to itselr. 1 9
But militias proved scarce and ill-armed.

At one point

Guatemala had only one regiment of infantry, later reduced
to a battalion of five fixed companies spread along its
borders, and one

brig~de

of artillery.

A total of 150 men

made up the entire permanent army charged with defending
Central America.
r ec r ui t

ab o u t

Provincial cavalry and infantry could

1 0 , 0 0 0 u n t rained men wh en n e e d e d • 2 0 J o s~

Rodriguez sums up the condition of the militias quite well:
suffice it to know that the defense of the
interests of the colonies, and those of Spain,
were not placed into able hands.
This is
evident in seeing what the colonial militias
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did.
They could not and should not be called a
regular army.
They are, instead, unthinking
groups who obe7 the principles of terror,
rather than those of the military moral code,
based on discipline. To form a judgement on or
to call an army what is basically a
oomglom!fate of Indians, creoles, and slaves is
absurd.
Major problems with existing forts included disrepair,
inadequate weapons, difficulty in maintaining provisions
and personnel, and funding--an item approved only on an
emergency basis. 22

This seemingly inadequate line of forte

had to stop the usurpation of Spanish territories by the
English along the entire Caribbean coast.

The Castillo de

San Fernando de Omoa resulted directly from this explosive
situation.

Chapter Threes

The Honduran Background

Mention of the bays along the north coast of Honduras
first reached Spa.in in 1524 when Gil Gonzalez n!vila threw
overboard some dead horses from one of his ships.

He named

the bay he was anchored in after them--Puerto de Caballos. 1
In 1539 Pedro de Alvarado used Puerto de Caba.llos, arriving
"with three thick ships and three hundred harquebusiers and
other many people. 112

He ordered 200 men to open a road

through to San Pedro Sula, a task that took them ten days
to

complete.

Alvarado

requested

the

Cabildo

(town

counoil)--presumably of Guatemala--to send a mayor and two
councilmen to demonstrate the
Alvarado

may

have

requested

encountered legal troubles

settlements' importance.
the

officials

because

he

with his credentials as the

representative of Hermn Cortez.3
By

the

mid-16th

aettlements--at

century,

that · time

Honduras

often

seven

confusingly termed

"oolonies"--the largest being Trujillo,
settlera.4

boasted

with some fifty

In 1584, the governor of Honduras, D. Rodrigo

Ponce de Le6n, wrote a letter from Trujillo suggesting
the port be £orti£ied, replacing the canteria
and thatch warehouse with a strong fort built
by an engineer.
This fort should house four
pieces of brass artillery, because Trujillo is
very much worth defending from the pirates.
Ponce also

wrote

the

same

Caballos.5
19

for

the

bay

of

Puerto

de

20

In 1592 Puerto Caballos fell to a band of pirates, who
reported

having looted some 200 wealthy houses, their haul

ammounting toi
5 or 6 tuns or quicksilver, 16 tuns or old
sacke, sheepe, young kids, great store or
poultrie, some store or money, & good lirinen,
silks, cotton-cloth, and such likeJ '6e also
took three belles out of the church •••
Puerto

Caballos

had

a

more

settlement until march of 1604,

or

less

permanent

when the discovery of

Puerto Santo Tomas prompted the colonists to move
entire town to that bay.

the

Santo Tomas had a more easily

defensible bay, which made it a much better port of entry.7
But the problem 0£ the pirates continued to plague the
settlement, even at its new location.
In 1677, Maestre de Campo Don Juan Francisco Saenz,
governor or Guatemala, ordered the construction or a .fort
at another bay in Central America, the port or Ma.tins., in
Costa Rica,
order,

with a garrison of one hundred men.

however,

This

did not go into effect until Governor

Miguel G<Smez de Lara re-issued it five yea.rs la.ter.8
By 1665, the British in Jamaica could easily harass the
Guatemalan colonists and

engage in rampant

smuggling,

defrauding the Spanish treasury of much-needed income.
Fifteen years later, the British also settled the north
coasts or Nicaragua and Honduras, known as the Moskitia,
and allied themselves with the Indians living there.

By

2)

1744 they had named officials to govern the Miskitos,
Colonel Robert Hodgson becoming "euperintendant" in that
year.

Spain vigorously protested this action, but found

herself not interested enough in the area to retaliate.9
Francisco de Montejo, the Adelantado to Yucatan and
later Governor of Honduras-Hibueras, planned in 1537 an
alternate

trade

route

between

Honduras, instead of Panama.

Peru

and

Spain through

Montejo proposed a route

between the Gulf of Fonseca and Puerto Caballos, over a
road through the valley or Comayagua. 1 0

Twenty-two years

later the Audiencia de Guatemala worked on the project,
finding many problems.

Engineer Juan Garc!a de Hermosilla

and Captain Pedro Ochoa Leguizam6n, mayor of Nicoya, had
resurrected the plan to spite the royal engineer Juan
Bautista Antonelli, who disapproved it.1 1

Antonelli had

studied the plan and written to the king, sending a resume
with recommendations:

the road would simply be too long.

At least 70 leguas 12 separated Puerto Caballos from the bay
of Fonseca,
carts,

and because the road could not accommodate

fourteen thousand mules would be required to carry

merchandise through sparsely populated areas at least six
times a year.

In 1590 Antonelli sent a description of

Puerto Caballos and the Bay of Fonseca, pointing out their
weaknesses and their strengths.
p 1 an s ,
them. 1 3

Nothing ever came of these

t h o ugh t he Au d i enc i a a p.en t

mu c h mone y a t u d y in g
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Montejo originall7 planned to consolidate Central
America.

San Pedro Sula and Comayagua would be the trading

centers for Nicaragua and Guatemala at first.

Later El

Salvador and even Panama could be serviced from Honduras.
The accountant, Cerezeda, the treasurer, Garc!a de Celis, a
Mr.

Pedraza,

and Pedro de Alvarado discussed the plan

together, and even presented it to the king, who rejected
it merely by a.eking £or much more money and information
than

they

could

supply.

After Bishop Francisco de

Marroqu!n of Guatemala advocated the move, however,

Felipe

I I named a .com mis a ion consisting or Juan Me ji a , Pedro de
Ochoa Leguizam6n, Field Marshall Juan de Tejeda, Captain
Francisco Valverde and Engineer Bautista Antonelli to study
the proposal.

He later appeared to have approved the plans

in principle,

though in action nothing ever happened. 1 4

Had it been approved and implemented, the bay at Omoa might
have been fortified much earlier in an e£fort to protect
the bay at Puerto Caballos, which Antonelli called "almost
indefensible."
There is some question over who sent in the first
request

or

recommendation

concerning a

fort

a.t

Omoa.

Calder6n Quijano gives the honor to Maestre de Campo Don
Juan de Barrientos y Guzman, who sent word in 1743 to the
king that a fort at the Ba.y of Omoa would stop or at least
slow down considerably the volume of illicit trade in the
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area. 1 5

The

English,

wintering port.

he

reported,

used

the bay as a

When fortified, it could aid greatly in

the protection of the entire Kingdom.

Manuel Zapatero, in

a much more recent study ( 1972), statesz
definitely, it was the President of the
Aud i en c i a , D. En r i q u e Enrique z , wh o wr o t e i n a
letter to the Monarch Charles II, dated in
1685, of the great possibility of the ports of
Trujillo and Caballoa of falling into the power
of the English, because of the ease with which
the pirates could attack from Belize, with
their allies the Zambo-Miskitos. Because of
this, he said, there was an "extreme need" to
fortify Omoa, a place unknown and unused as a
por t •
Wi t h En ri q u e z o p e n s t h e in t e r e s t in
Omoa, an~ to him belongs the first defensive
oonc.ept. l 6
Enr!quez asked for harquebusea instead of rifles,
for a military engineer to defend Guatemala.
would cut the cost of defense,

and

An engineer

as well a.a increase the

defenses, if only by planning a fort at Omoa.

Enr!quez had

raised 8,000 pesos for the project, mainly from donations
by the town councils and the church.
In July of 1751 two reports concerning Omoa showed the
English occupying Roa.tan, Guanaja, Masaguera, and Utila so
as to protect their compatriots in the R:!o Tinto a.rea.17
So fortifying Omoa had two major advantagess

to prevent

further English incursions into the area, and to avoid the
expense of rebuilding the redoubt and fort at Golfo Dulce.
The new fort would have a much greater strategic value
because of its new location.

By adopting this kind of

mentality, both Barrientos and Enr!quez appealed to the
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militarists of the aggressive warfare theory.
looated bay could defend a

A centrally

larger area with

its

navy,

especially if it had the best port along the coast.
According to Rubio Banchez, the forts at San Felipe,
Matina and

San Juan had

defend the north coasts:

been built

to psychologically

they were not strong enough to

withstand an enemy attack, but they gave the colonists a
sense or security.

The Audiencia of Guatemala knew that,

and wanted a strong fort, one which could properly defend
the port or entry to the Kingdom. 1 8
The first serious initiative for the construction of
Omoa came from Don
oidor

(judge)

Guatemala.

and

Joa~

Rodezno Manzolo y Rebolledo, an

member

of

the

Real

Audiencia

In a letter to the king dated March 4,

of

1723,

Rodezno recommended a fort at Omoa to decrease the volume
of illegal trade going on there.

Rodezno had been named

oidor supernumerario (supernumerary
May,

judge) on the

1710, taking office the following March 16.

16th of
He spent

the next twelve years spying on royal officers in Honduras,
to see how many were involved in illegal smuggling with the
Eritish pirates.

Returning from that commission on January

22, 1722, he reported to the king the following year the
results of his

investigation.

The recommendation of a

fort, he claimed, he sent only in service of the king, for
its implementation would cause serious unrest in the area--
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which it did, as will be seen later.

But the fort could

serve to infuse life into a dead province, to rebuild its
economy,

to stimulate enough trade to resurrect the then-

illegal Honduras-Havana trade route.19

Rodezno~s

plan

included financing the construction with the sale of 4,500
arrobas 20 of Zarsa (sarsaparilla).
fort of Golfo Dulce,

The garrison at the

which even the British considered

useless, could be transported to Omoa, as it only defended
the seldom-used warehouses.
Rodezno,

like the engineer Luis Diez Navarro after

him, advised making the commander of Omoa governor and
captain-general
efficiency.

of

the

province,

for

the

sake

of

Since as yet no military engineer worked in

the Kingdom, he asked the Viceroy of New Spain to send one
for

the

job,

Arguelles. 21
inaccurate.

recommending

Don

Diego

His description of Omoa,

Guti~rrez

however,

de

was quite

He compared it to San Felipe de Golfo Dulcet

Everything is diametrically opposed in said
port of Omoas its temperature is healthful, it
has a beautiful bay with a port seven arm
lengths deep C 11.7 metere2, clear water, and
is large enough to accommodate any warship.
The latter can take ~~ver near the site where a
fort can be erected.
This description could not in part be farther from the
truth:

Alcedo

noted

that

unhealtful of America." 2 3
construction of the fort,
claimed many lives.24

"its

weather

Later on,

was

the

most

throughout the

the battle with the climate
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But

Rodezno's report

continued,

enumerating about

twenty varieties of fruit that grew there--fruit that could
be abundant if properly exploited.

r or t

p 1 a. n for th e

He sent a map and a

, d r a wn up by 0 no fr e Nd ne z , a pr i e s t , i n

the absence of a military engineer or an architect.
maps,

while being accurate,

carelessly drawn,

had been very sloppily and

for he apparently did not have much

training as a draftsman.

The plans showed a quadrangular

fort of the bulwarked system,
de

Wfiez'

which D. Sebastian Fermndez

Medrano, teacher and director of the Academia Real y

Militar de los Paisea Bajoa, had declared the best possible
style. 2 5

The style followed that of the Field Marshal

Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, Royal engineer of Louis XVI
of Frances

renaissance, baroque, and neoclassic at one

time--a very popular combination during the sixteenth
through nineteenth centuries.
The plans showed, by impressive and sophisticatedlooking line
Technically,

charts,

the areas

covered by

cannonfire.

-

the bulwarked system was one of the best, for

it left no wall undefended1

cannon could shoot parallel to

all of the outside walls.

Nunez' fort measured 800 feet

"de brabante", the faces 351 feet long, the flanks 106, and
the curtains 480.

He expressed the opinion that although

most people wanted the fort

pl~ced

on "point 83" on his

map--probably the north point--it should be farther south
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at the deepest end of the bay.

Some of those who disagreed

later included the Conde de Aranda, who designed the fort,
engineer

Luis

construction,
c o mp 1 e t e d i t •

Diez

de

Navarro,

who

started

the

and engineer Francisco Alvarado,

who

As i t t urned out , Nu ii e z ' s i t e 1 at er prov e d

the better one, and became the site for the conetruction. 2 6
But NUnez was no engineer.

Rather, he was an amateur

who apparently had travelled through France and had become
acquainted with the new Vauban style.

His plans did not

convince the Council of the Indies, which sent a memo to
the king on the third of September, 1723, informing him
that the report merely reflected the opinions of Rodezno
and Nunez.

More plans to confirm the validity of these

opinions should be ordered, preferably by the government of
the Captaincy-general.

On February 16,

1724,

Rodezno's

request finally received validation, but no action ever
came

from

it.27

Proof

that

Rodezno's report

did not

receive much credit in the Court can be seen when on July
25,

17 4 0 ,

Guatemala,

Don Pe d r o de Ri be r a y Vi 11a16 n ,
reported

pr e s id en t

of

receiving orders on the firs .t

of

October to fortify Trujillo and Matina.

These would form

part of the system of defense covering the entire north
coast from Matina through Bluefielde, and Cape Graciae a
28
Dios to Trujillo.
But as no military engineer had
arrived in the Kingdom yet, nothing could be done.
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On April 12,

1745,

Ribera recommended to the king

another plan to fortify Omoa..

Thie time, unfortunately,

his recommendation clashed with current plans to reduce
fortif7ing Central America because of a new
Agreement with England.

Nevertheless,

Madrid

the Council of the

Indies passed a motion to transfer all the plans for an1
f or t on the Ca r i b b ea n t o Ze n6 n d e So mod e vi 11 a , Mar q u e z d e
la Ensenada..

Appointed to the Council in 1743 for the

reorganization of the defenses of the Spanish colonies, his
plans to force the British from the Caribbean entailed
force of arms.

This aggressive policy diverted the Spanish

offensive from the Black River in the Moskitia area to
Belize.

But the reality of Spain's economy clashed with

Somodevilla'e plansz
and fight.

he could not afford to both fortify

Sensing that successful fighting might keep his

name in the king's favor more easil7, he sent armies into
Belize during Vazquez Prego's term as Captain-general of
Guatemala,
Britain,s

to expel the

claim

to

woodcutters who

the area.

reinforced

Funds allotted for

the

project at Omoa. had to be used to pay the army in Belize,
further delaying construction of the fort.29
Somodevilla's policies seem ver1 confusing,
not very well thought through.

possibly

He eagerl1 favored the

proposed Omoa project, and probably helped insure its Royal
approval by choosing the name San Fernando, after the king
whose favorite minister he had become.30

Nonetheless,

his

29

orders to send armies to Belize did hinder financing the
construction of the fort.
After careful planning, Somodevilla issued new orders:
Colonel Juan de Vera received the Commandancia General de
Armas (military commandancy) in Comayagua,

and Alonso

Fermndez de Heredia the Lieutenant-colonelcy in charge of
L e6 n .

Th i s , in e ff e c t , 1 o we r e d t h e capt a i n c y - gene r a l ' s

military job in Guatemala to that of a quartermaster.

The

responsibility for the construction of Omoa fell to Vera.
But Vera also delayed the project because he lacked an
engineer, the only one available being tied up in repairing
the

fort

at

Inmaculada

Concepci6n

in

Nicaragua.

The

engineer, during an inspection tour, had found himself
named Castellano (commander) by Fermndez when the previous
commander at the fort had died.

Then Vera died in 1747,

and Fermndez took on the leadership of Comayagua, while at
the same time holding down his job in Nicaragua.31

Chapter Four:

The Early Years;

Luis D!ez Navarro

A shortage of military engineers created the biggest
initial problem surrounding the construction at Omoa.
work existed than engineers to plan and do it,

More

so low

priority areas had to wait until they became important
before having an engineer assigned to them.

The title

Military Engineer only meant that the holder had joined the
military for his training:

he could plan towns and

civilian buildings as well as military installations.
Finally,

on

the

twenty-fourth

of

March,

1741,

a

transfer order was issued for a fifty-year-old Lieutenant,
engineer extra-ordinary,

to move to the Captaincy-general

of Guatemala:
Having heard what D. Pedro Ribera has reported
on December 15, 1739, and on May 15, 17110, and
what has been reported in the Council of Indies
on December 17, 17JJO, His Majesty has resolved
to move the engineer extraordinary D. Luis Drez
Navarro to Guatemala City from Mexico City, to
put into effect the orders of the mentioned D.
Pedro Ribera on the construction of the forts
planned, one at the mouth of the Matina river,
and one at Trujillo, to defend the provinces:
from His Majesty's orders I instruct you to
execute these with all due haste. 1
A year later Luis Diez Navarro left his work on the
new mint of Mexico City and probably accompanied Tomas
Rivera y Santa Cruz,
Pedro Ribera,

the new Captain-general replacing

to Guatemala.

There is,

however,

confusion as to exactly when he went to Guatemala.
30

some
The
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Royal Order on March 24 sent him to sound bays, landings,
and to study the possibilities for a permanent rort. 2
Later, reportedly after having been in Guatemala City for
some time,

his name was submitted to a

vote for a

commission as visitador (inspector), on December 23,

17JJ2.

Rivera y Santa Cruz approved the trip, though Drez may not
have received notice to leave until January 9, 1743.

The

confusion arises over where he worked in Mexico City when
his marching orders arrived, and whether Diez arrived in
Guatemala in 1742 or in 1743.3
which source is consulted.

The solution depends on

nrez himself wrotea

through a Royal Order of March 24, 1741,
received while in Mexico City, I was instructed
to go to this capital Guatemala to put into
effect the construction of the two forts at Rro
Matina and the port of Trujillo;
I obeyed the
order by leaving Mexico in July of last year,
1742, and presented myself to Your Excellency
with my credentials • • • • 4
Later, he wrote in 1773, "it will be thirty-one years ago
next October (after seeing I was in Mexico, and Veracruz)
that I arrived in this capital of Guatemala

• • • •

n5

Di e z b e c a me one of t h e mo s t out s tan di n g e n g 1 n e e r s in
the Indies.

A native of li!laga, his military career began

before the age of 17, when he went to the
Africa

in

Spanish forts of

1718 with the Segundo Cuerpo de la Real

Artiller!a--the Royal artillery.

After working some time

in Barcelona in 1720, he spent three years as one of the
first students in the Real y Militar Academia founded by
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Vauban;
oivil

apparently distinguishing himself very well in
He

engineering.

worked

for

a

short

time

in

Gibraltar, and then went, recommended by Vauban, to work
under Ignacio Sala in Cadiz, where he learned the famous
"poligdn cuadrado" fortification system. 6
In 1732, after moving to the Americas--first of all to
Veraoruz--he

worked

at

the

fort

of

San

Juan

Moving on to Mexico City, he built a new mint,
and modified a

the

Royal

Hospital

of

the

Ulua.

blueprinted

the drainage of

mill, and helped design

Mexico City (Lake Texcoco).

de

Just when he began to build
Indies,

he

received

the

appointment to the Kingdom of Guatemala to oversee the
fortification of the north coast of Central America.
His first

job in Guatemala involved rebuilding the

forts at Matina and Trujillo.

Instead of starting on these

immediately, he began his inspection tour, during which he
divised the plans and recommendations for the fort of San
Fernando de
received

a

Omoa~

After starting to build this fort, he

transfer

in

1756 back to Guatemala City to

oversee all constructions in the Kingdom.7

His rapid rise

through the ranks of the military may not have been totally
based on
(ordinary

merits

the

engineer)

promotion to

ingenier~

and to Lieutenant

of the Infantry,

along with the ensuing salary increase to
year 8

may

have

been

to

sweeten

the

ordinario

1000 pesos a

transfer

from

the
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capital of New Spain to the relatively unimportant poet in
Guatemala.9
Soon after

his

arrival

in Guatemala,

J>iez had been

appointed as a Visitador General de los Presidios (general
inspector of the forts) to carry out a general survey of
the defenses of the Kingdom.

He received the power to take

declarations and oaths from officials and leading citizens
concerning any matter he deemed important.
the appointment

of Jeronimo de Rosal,

He requested

a friend from Spain,

as his Lieutenant, and had him appointed as such on January
2,

17113. 1 0

Zapatero adds that Drez" orders included giving

an opinion concerning the situation at Omoa. 11

Later that

month he began his ins'pection tour with a report of San
Felipe del Golfo Dulce, which he had not seen yet.
British had begun

As the

creeping into Peten and the Rio Walis

(Belize) area again,

a fort at that location would be a

good idea, but the bay was simply too shallow to

warrant

the expense, and besides, the British could probably take
anything re-erected there very easily. 12
long been ignored by the enemy,

This fort had

who considered it basically

useless.
On February

23, Di'.ez arrived in Comayagua and met with

the military leaders to determine their opinions concerning
a permanent installation on the north coastline.

Juan de

Barrientos y

of the

province,

Guzman,

quickly

the

declared

Lieutenant-Governor
in

favor

of the

Omoa

site.
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Francisco Antonio Irache preferred the established port of
Trujillo, but expressed concern over the extreme cost or
rebuilding the defenses.
Lope a

Pod i6,

Fe 1 i p e

The rest of the leaders,

Grajeda.,

Fe 11 x

de

Hon t~ e,

Joe~

Car 1 o s

Ortega, and Juan Pacheco, followed Barrientos in supporting
the Omoa location.13

Drez then visited the bay itself, on

the eleventh or March, in company with the Governor and
Captain Francisco

other locals acquainted with the areas
Antonio Iraohe,

Lieutenant

Joseph L6pez,

ship Captain

Domingo Podi6, Captain .Felipe Grajeda of the Infantry of
Blacks and his assistant Felix de Montes, Juan Pacheco and
Juan de Buena Ventura, probably the scouts assigned to
patrol the bay,

Phelipe Santiago, Juan Mallorca,

U!za.ro de

Castro, and Cavalry Lieutenant Carlos de Ortega. 1 ~
The following month, on March 23, Diez reached Yoro,
the nearest safe Spanish settlement to Trujillo.

After

being advised by all the town leaders not to risk personal
danger by visiting Trujillo,

he sent his lieutenant

Ger6nimo de Rosai to scout the area.

With the latter's

report in hand, D!ez called a meeting in the town hall and
received support for recommending Omoa as a preferable site
for a. new fort, rather than rebuilding Trujillo.
Trujillo could not be considered a very good place to
fortify for at lea.st one major reasons
because

or a

wide open,

low strategic value

shallow bay.

Being close to
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Roatan;

any fortification could be easily taken by English

baymen living there.

The pirates,

according to

local

reports, had even been taking bricks from the demolished
In a

Spanish garrisons to build their houses on Roatan.

letter report to the king, Ili'.ez listed many reasons for his
decision to abandon Trujillo in favor of Omoa.
had a more easily defensible bay:

The latter

Miskitos and Zambos did

not control the roads to Omoa from the interior, whereas
thus the

all the paths to Trujillo were in their hands;
Register ship could dock

at

Omoa and

transport

overland to Guatemala in relative safety.
many other ports,

goods

Omoa, close to

could prevent illegal smuggling in such

areas as Chamelec6n, Sula, Los Leones, Sal, el Play6n de
Triunfo de Cruz, and several others.

Thus Diez showed his

purpose for the fort to be an aggressive one, to search out
and destroy the pirates before they came to wreak havoc on
Spanish towns:
His Majesty can easily place .his corsair
ships in the shelter of this port and easily
destroy the English town~ again, and stop their
commerce with Trujillo. 1
Only docile Xicaque Indians,
enemies

of

the

Zambos

and

afraid of the English and
Miskitos,

lived

in

the

surrounding areas. Trujillo provided too large a bay, one
that would take several forts to defend, with a port just
too inconvenient to justify such an expense.
Trujillo catered to (Sonaguera,

The areas

San Jorge Olancho,

and
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Olanoho

Viejo)

had

also

been

known

to

aid

English

smuggling, so moving the port of entry for the Register
ships would also serve to punish these delinquent

towns,

by taking that commerce away from them. 16
Before continuing his trip onward to Nicaragua and
Costa Rica, nrez sent back to Guatemala a plan for a square
shaped fort at Omoa:
It is a project of a quadrangular fort, situated
in the interior part of the oriental point of
the inlet elevated over a platform and with an
esplanade that presents shade to achieve a
greater overhang.
It has four bulwarks
corresponding to the angles of the fort, each
one flanking two gun emplacements.
The
buildings are all in the interior of the
fortified enclosure, leaving in the f enter a
large extension for the weapons plaza. 1
This design,
receive

like several subsequent editions, did not

approval.

Salvatierra.

octogonal star-shaped fort,

mentions

plans

for

an

and an a.mended plan submitted

later with a length of 106 feet, a width of 126 feet, and
an outside diameter of 639 feet.18
Upon arriving in Nicaragua, Diez served as the mayor
and commander of the fort of Inmaculada Concepci6n on the
R:! o San Juan ,

whe r e

t he

pre v i o u s

may o r

had

ju s t

di ed.

Later, in Costa Rica, he found a similar situation:

Don

Juan Germin y Leonart had just died, so Diez, as ranking
officer,

took

over as

interim governor of Costa Rica.

Brigadier Don Alonzo Hermndez de Heredia of the Audiencia
de

los

Confines

later

regularized

his

appointment

on
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January 20,

1748,

and D!ez remained there for three yearsi

his rank rose to Ingeniero en Segundo (engineer,

second

grade) and Captain of the Infantry. 1 9
Between 1751 and 1755,

Diez had time to work on his

original plan--the actual fort at Omoa.

A year after his

arrival at the site, he rose in rank to Chief Engineer and
Lieutenant
personally

Colonel
built

of

only

the

Infantry.

civilian

After

buildings,

1755

he

despite

his

military appointment the following year as Director of
Engineers,

Reviewer

of Land

Measurements

full Colonel in the Infantry. 2 0

(surveyors),

On November 30,

1758,

and
nlez

applied to Secretary of the Indies Julian de Arriaga for
permission to return to Spain permanently.

His letter,

written officially, and signed as the Director Engineer and
Colonel, resulted from a bitter enmity with the Captaingeneral, Arcos y Moreno.

Diez, ill from a recent trip to

Omoa, had apparently reached the end of his patience with
Arcos.21

This letter provides most of the biographical

material available on Diez,
his

life

and

work.

The

remained in Guatemala,

for he gave Arriaga a resume of
request

being turned

down,

he

where he died on the eleventh of

April of 1780, after having seen the official completion,
loss and recuperation of his pet project at Omoa.
After returning to Guatemala City in 1751, Diez drew up
plans

for

Central

a

comprehensive

America.

He

military

outlined

key

defense

system

locations

in

where
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fortifications could be

built ae a starting point for

offensives against British settlements in Belize and the
Hoskitia.

Of these, Omoa. would be the largeets

it would

signal commitment to a permanent return or Spanish
authority to the north coast.

Diez sent his plans along

with the report of his survey to Spain on the seventh of
April, 17115, and repeated them in hie letter of 1751.
chapters

on

Omoa.

gave

an

accurate description

The

of the

coastal topography, placing the bay itself at seventeen
leagues from Golfo Dulce,

141 from Guatemala.,

sixteen from

San Pedro Sula, twelve from Candelaria. Vieja., and sixty-two
from Comaya.gua.
Central

D!ez described Omoa. as the best bay in

America.a

clean,

safe,

with a cape.city for

approximately twenty-five ships at anchor at one time.
This port is the most secure, clean and
sheltered of all the Coast of Honduras, for
which motive it has appeared to me appropriate
that it be fortified, at less cost and risk,
than any other of said coasts it offers many
accomodations, and very favorable oon~~quences
for this kingdom, which I shall state.
D!ez listed thirteen reasons to fortify Omoa.

The

fort could assist in restocking corsairs armed by the king
of Spain.

Register ships could anchor easilya

it had a

good bay for repairing ships, as well as "much cedar wood."
The

Register

could

load

with

dyes,

cacao,

indigo,

Brazilwood, vanilla, "exquiai·te balms," honey,

wax, and

other things cultivated in nearby regions.

This commerce
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oould help populate the town of Omoa and surrounding areas.
More importantly, defense would prevent use of the bay by
pirates,

which would benefit the Crown by bringing safety

to the region.

A navy could be equipped to

wage war on

pirates in places like the island of Roatan and the Miskito
coast,
coasts so infested by enemies and pirates who,
finding such places alone and undefended,
inhabit and harass them.
Add to that the
damage they can cause and the intimidation of
the settlers, with the embarrassment they cause
by moving within sight or the construction
site, it would serve them right to extirpate
and exile the pirates from these seas and
habitations, a thing which could without a
doubt be accomplished, with time. 2 3
An aggressive policy

had to be used to expel the

illegals from the area, because without opposition they
continued to spread and strengthen, by their mere presence,
a claim on the land,

to Spain's detriment.

His Majesty's corsair ships could easily be armed and
would be very close in said port (Omoa,7 to the coast
of Valis ~BelizeJ (which they could reach in three
days) and to the cape of Gracias a Dios and the Gulf
of Matina. With this kind or protection the Miskito
Indians and Zambos and the English settlements on this
coast should lessen day by d~y, and it will not be
1 on g before the Eng 1 i sh s et t 1 e men t s in Ri o Tint o and
Ro a tti n wi 11 be c o me uni n ha bi t e d , by ta. k in g aw a y t h e i r
hope of continuing to trade illegally with the Spanish
on these coasts, which is why said nation has allowed
them to settle here.
And it would be profitable to both of Your
Majesties to expel them from these coasts, because its
closeness to the homes of Zambos and Hi~\itos allows
them to disturb our operations with ease.
The
fertile,

lands

surrounding Omoa appeared to be very

and only 140 leagues separated the port from
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Diez' second plan to fortify Omoa.

4I

Guatemala.25
transport

or

calafetes
shortage

In hie recommendation, D!ez requested the
carpenters,

(ship
of

brickmasons,

carpenters),

these

skills

tailors,

plagued

the

blacksmiths,

and

cobblers--a

entire

kingdom.

Artillery experts also could be ueed to train the locals in
the art of

modern warfare.

Other ports could be served from Omoas
distance of five days of travelJ
daysJ

Havana,

Bacalar, at a

Balis (Belize), at two
Guanabacoa at

at about fifteen;

eightJ

Cabo Gracias at three to eight, depending on the windJ
Matina

at

five

conditions.
central,

to

twelve,

depending

also

on

and
wind

These distances showed even more proof of the

strategic location of Omoa.26

Apparently Diez' plans for

the fort

had

not

been

accepted in Spain, for he reinforced them by sending what
is now called the second project to fortify Omoa, on the
14th of April,
square fort,

1745. 2 7
with four

The blueprints corresponded to a
bulwarks

in proportion

square--a very well planned fort.
varas wide, 2 8 though the normal
the landfills
normal 601
than-normal

to

the

The moat would be 15

moat usually measured ~2J

sloped out only 25 varas,

instead of the

a smaller-than-normal fort called for smallersupporting structures.

A parapet

wall and

drawbridge served as exit, and accommodations included a
permanent garrison for four hundred men,

with emergency
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room for two hundred more.

As to the garrison,

it should be equipped with 400 men1
200 of
which should be peninsular Spaniards, veterans
of the army, and if they could be married it
would .be very convenient to the Royal Service
(even though it is contrary to the Royal Orders
which in these Countries cannot be followed to
the letter) with which two propitious things
can be obtainedz firstly, the most assurance
that they live quietly and free from the much
chasing bachelors are subject to in this
kingdom of the sin of carnal delight;
and
secondly, that having their women and children
in the castle, they will not escape (deaer~
easilyJ
within a few years they will become
honorabl~
inhabitants
throughout
the
2
province. Y
Keeping in mind the king's decree to reduce the size
of the forts in the Indies, Drez knew he would have trouble
in recommending a fort to hold 400 men.

But if built, Omoa

would carry the defense of the entire Kingdom, so no risk
should be taken that enemies of the king would laugh at the
fort.30

Writing about the commandant of the new fort, Drez

recommended "it
military man,

would also be

convenient

that

he be a

and not just any fellow countryman [Spaniard)

as I have always seen them send . •

• • "3 1

According to Calder6n Quijano, D!ez sent these plans,
along with a recommendation not to leave the bay to the
Zambos and smugglers,

in July of 1744.

Zapatero gives

three dates for the sending of

plansz

the

1745--"Plans

second

plan

he

dates

in

projected to fortify the port of Omoa,"
450 Fies de Francia (scale feet).

the one he labels
of

a

fort

with a scale of

The other two plane he
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dates earlier&

one in 1743, "Plans of a fort projected for

the fortification of the port of Omoa which is

situated on

the north sea on the coast of Honduras," with a scale of
500 feetJ the other dated 1744, "Plans of the bay, and Port
of Omoa," with a square fort on the scale of 250 varas of
Castille.3 2
The report given in Garc!a Pelaez' book contrasts the
differences between Omoa and Trujillo.
safe

inland access,

been under the

The latter had no

as all the roads leading there had

control of the zambos for some time.

For

this reason the Register ship from Spain could never land
there safely.
build.

Even

reinstatemant

Besides,
the

Omoa would be much cheaper to

fertility

of trade

of

the

land

and

between Guatemala and

the

Havana,

prohibited by the king due to its lack of safety, was used
as an excuse to fortify Omoa.33
Despite a law to the contrary,34 D!ez proposed that the
commander

of

the

fort

be

governor

of a new

organization called the Coast of Honduras,
include

Gracias,

Gracia.a a Dios,

San

Pedro

Sula,

and Trujillo;

from a state capital

to a

San Jorge

political

which would
Olanchito,

Comayagua should be reduced

regional capital.

Increased

military and governmental efficiency would result.35

If

the commanding officer of the fort were also governor of
the new province, it would cut bureaucracy by not having to
route paperwork through Comayagua.

The governor could
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receive taxes from the money and minerals from the Honduras
mines, and deal more effectively with British
and

smugglers

pirates.
King Fernando VI and the accountant of the Council of

Indies agreed in principle to the fortification,

if only

because Trujillo could prove too costly to defend.
report

of April

12,

1745,

along with

Rivera's

Diez'

letters

recommending the fort on April 12, 1745, probably changed
the

King's

mind.

Rivera

wrote

that

although

the

fort

clashed with Royal intentions to reduce military spending,
it could be built with the surplus 221,000 pesos he had
sent to the court earlier that year.36
In the meantime,
construction.

Juan

preparations had been made for the
de Vera,

the governor of Honduras,

asked the Marquez de la Ensenada for artillery to defend
the site, suggesting Campeche, Golfo Dulce, and Cartagena
as possible sources:
sending cannon.37

all three responded positively by

Two scouts went to watch the bay and

report any ship movement in the area;

they shared a salary

of 1,277 pesos, presumably annually.38
Changes in the administration in Guatemala hindered the
progress

of the

program

more than anything else.

Jose

Araujo y Rio became Captain-general on September 23,

1748.

The following December 21 Colonel Pantaloon Imiiez received
orders to replace the deceased Vera in Honduras,

but he
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took several months to arrive.

By 1750 IMiiez had been

replaced by Fer?Bndez de Heredia.

Fer?Bndez asked Ensenada

to appoint a military adjunct in Guatemala. to take charge
of all military construction, as the current President,
Tonne de Ribera, very slow to act, opposed
than

hie

own,

acting

offended

when

any ideas other
anyone

showed

initiative--such as when Fermndez took over the leadership
in Honduras.39
On January 17, 1752, Mariscal del Campo D. Jose Prego
Montaoz y Soto Mayor, the new Captain-general, sought to
implement Diez' fortification system by giving orders on
the twenty-eighth of the same month to begin construction
at Omoa.

He asked the President of the Royal Coffers to

ready funds--50,000 pesos to begin with, and a reserve of
61,642 pesos.

Jose Antonio Palma received the military

commander's post at the site, and Luis Guasco became Sobreesta.nte,

or

euperintendant,

schedule was drawn up:
bacon;

of

the

works.

A rations

Sunday and Thursday, six ounces of

Monday and Wednesday, eight ounces of salt meat if

at sea, and
cheese.

fresh while on land;
Every

da.y

the

Saturday, five ounces of

troops

would

receive

four

cuartilloe (quarts) of water--three to drink and one to
cook

with,

plus

24

ounces

of

firewood.

This

ration

schedule became the biggest single expense to the Roya.1
Coffers.

At first all supplies had to come by sea, which

ca.used some problems because some of the sailors,

fearing
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Omoa's reputation as a place of death, deserted when they
found out their ship's destination.
ordered all deserters arrested,

To counter this,

Prego

and anyone aiding them

punished and charged for any damages caused.

The King sent

3,000 muskets with bayonets, plus flints and bullets to the
new garrison.40
Prego died the following year after falling ill during
a trip to Omoa.

He had, however, altered the blueprints

for the fort:4 1

on the twenty-fifth of April,

1752, he met

with a Council of War and declared the fort designed by
Diez too big.

Prego believed a garrison of 200 men and a

circular redoubt along the beach would be sufficient.

The

length should be only 130 to 150 varas, instead of the 470
Diez

called for.

Two members of the Audiencia,

de Superviela and Jorge Juan,

believed an

Don Pedro

even smaller

garrison--80 to 100 men--would meet the needs of the

port.

A structure of one-tenth the size Diez recommended could
house

the

men,

and should

topography of _the area.4 2

be

planned according

The committee also

the

not be

The only real defense could be nature itself,

humidity,

the sterile land,

the

voiced the

opinion--a correct one--that the pirates could
stopped.

to

in

and the high incidence of

disease, because inlets and islands they could hole up in
abounded.

The only reason to defend an area like Omoa
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would be as an

offensive measure, to a.rm and stock a fleet

against the British.43
The Council of Var in Guatemala wrote up a plan for
the defense of its north coasts, emphasizing the need for a
coast guard fleet.

They felt the British and Miskitos were

getting away with too much illegal commerce, and needed to
be

stopped.

projected,

The

planned

coast

guard,

the

Council

should consist of squadrons of five

each--a ship, a frigate,
differing capacities.

a

vessels

jabeque, and two piroguea of

The pirogue could travel up rivers

farther than the rest,

but were too small to cope with

ocean-going frigates and ships.

Thus each vessel in the

squadron would complement the rest,

making it an effective

weapon against all types of pirate ships.

This coast guard

could possibly tame the islands and coasts inhabited by the
pirates and Hiekitos.
But

the

Council

went

a.

step

further

recommendation of this coast guard, · pointing out
for

one

or

activities.

more

safe

ports

which

to

its

the need
base

its

These ports could not be "merely lost beaches,

or open roadstead,

or the

enough

the

to

from

in

shelter

like,

entire

but rather ports

fleet. 11 411

There

large

were

no

rivers large enough to accomodate ships, thus ruling out
the forts
river.

at Golfo Dulce,

R!o San Juan,

and the Matins.

The port at Omoa would be the best, following the

opinion of the engineer D!ez,

though it was rather far from
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the bases

of the

English and

Miskitos.

Trujillo,

the

lagoon of Nicaragua, and the river mouth at Matina, though
poor locations,

coincided with the distances between forts

the Council wanted.

They thought it incredible that of all

the ports and bays or the Caribbean coast,

only Puerto

Caballos had a bay large enough to compare with Omoa, and
it was too close to the latter to be of any uae.45
So Omoa became the site for this proposed fort.
intention was aggressivez

Its

to serve as a base of operations

for a fleet of corsairs who would patrol the coasts and
attack the pirates in their home ports.

It is interesting

to note that at no time did anyone consider a fort on the
Bay Islands.
such a

fort

After forcing the pirates from that location,
could

have

done

more

authority than any on the mainland.

to

assert

Spanish

That, of course, would

have meant conquering the islands first and then fortifying
them, which would have cost the Crown much more money than
any mainland fort.

Chapter Fivei

The First Construction Period

Action during the 7ears 1753 through 1755 proved slow
at Omoa.
weapons

mez reported having been assigned the soldiers,
and

ammunition

needed,

though

he

lacked

the

artillery (20 and 25 pounds) to mount on the low redoubt
under oonetruotion to protect the site.

He expressed an

interest in being appointed as chief engineer, requesting
that I
be the engineer assigned to the
construction because of my training in that
field, and having come to these Kingdoms to
practice that era.ft under the orders of my
superiors and of Hie Majesty,
~othing impedes
me to accept the responsibility.
Several major problems had to be surmounted.

A second

engineer had to be found in case Diez became ill or died.
Negroes, more suited than Indians or Spaniards for labor in
the coastal regions, had to be brought from far away, as
did food and supplies.
was

that

of funds.

One of the most pressing shortages
The Viceroy of New Spain promised

100,000 pesos per year for the project, but that apparently
did not cover all expensea.2
Arcos y Moreno replaced Prego as Captain-general on
January 29, 1752.

The following April 15th, he promoted

Diez to Lieutenant-colonel, and as such,
officer at Omoa.

the commanding

That year D!ez drew a map of the area,

showing the roads to Puerto Caballos, the Omoa River, and
the soundings of the port, and a drawing of the low redoubt
50

5I

or El Real,

to be built to protect the oonstruction--or as

Zapatero put it, "El Real,

which was made or stakes and

pieces of trees, for a protection, while the Work is being
made."3
A very useful member joined the staff' in November or
17521

medical doctor Abundio Salom6n.

Many workers had

died because or the bad climate, so the Audienoia saw fit
to pay Salom6n fifty pesos a

month to try to

malaria and yellow fever common to the port.4
do so had not been very sucoessfula

stop the

Attempts to

:nrez himself lost his

wife and three eldest daughters in 1748, after having moved
with them to the fort to set an example and raise morale
among those stationed there.5
Later, Diez wrote a detailed expense report, listing
all financial activity under hie charge from April 7,
through February 20,
requested.

175~,

1755, and submitted it to Arcos as

Other than having detained a sloop temporarily,

nothing worth writing about had occurred.

The Council of

the Indies caused most of the delays the Captain-general
complained

about,

though

this

could not

be

seen in

Guatemala.

Arcos wrote a letter to the Council, accusing

Diez of being lazy and of spending money needlessly, not
realizing that the court itself caused the delays by not
approving any plans for Diez to use.

Diez continued to

send blueprints to Spain for approval1 in 1756 he submitted
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one for a fort called Santa Barbara.
square fort,
seaside

this one had a

polygon

measured

greater cannon coverage.

variation--the outside,

105

varaa,

being

curved

the powder rooms,

and other miscellaneous details.

present

hazard.

a

for

kitchen,

The powder

rooms were located in the landfills of the bulwarks,
could

or

The plan showed in great detail

the location of the stores,
barracks,

Another plan for a

dangerous

situation

because

of

which
fire

This may have been too controversial for Aranda,

for he rejected the plans once more.6
Aranda rejected all of Diez' plans from 1746 through
1756, and made no move to supply any new ones, until he
finally drew up a set on December 15, 1756.

It is possible

that the Seven Years' War helped speed things up for the
project, by showing the need for some defense along the
Caribbean.
then,

Somodevilla had fallen from the king's grace by

but Arriaga and the war secretary Sebastian de Eslava

followed his policies very closely, at least immediately
following his demise.

The Council approved Aranda's set of

plans in 1751, · and orders were sent to Arcos y Moreno to
build according to them.

A set of these plans arrived in

Guatemala unsigned, but later designs point to Aranda as
the

author

and

designer.

That

communication

or

bureaucratic problems existed in the court can be seen in
the explanation sent with the plans, stating that
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not having a profile or the land, nor knowing
the altitude or the land in relation to the
level of the sea, the author had not been able
to fix a profile to his
Plan1 this should be
taken into account by the Engineer at the time
of the Construction, elevating the Fort's floor
several feet higher than that or the moat. The
stores should be one foot higher than that of
the Arms Plaza, to avoid too much humidity in
the barracks: this same reason held true for a
careful drainage or rainwater. These and other
considerations were left to the prudence and
intelligence7or the engineer in charge or the
construction.
The drawings showed a triangular fort with a curved
forward

curtain.

Apparently

this,

rather

than

the

traditional square fort, had been proposed because or the
lower cost

involved,

though

considered the best design.

the triangle could not

CristObal de Rojas,

be

a military

engineer under Felipe II and professor in the first.
Academia

de

Portificaciones

Espanolaa

in

Madrid,

had

written that the triangular design should be used only if
no other design were possible.

He believed the angles to

be too sharp, which became a defect during any defense in a
battle.

If, however,

the engineer insisted on building it,

the front walls should be at least 600 feet long.a

But

these schools or military architecture did not usually
prove to be right in America;
the same as in Spain.

conditions were simply not

The Indians and the pirates did not

follow the accepted methods for fighting a war,
forts

planned

in

Spain

usually

did

not

so the

prove

very

54
practical.

As a result, they became Americanized, modified

to create a oriollo style of fort architecture.
The

construction seriously interrupted the tranquility

of Omoa,
Workers

because

of the

travelled

from

Salvador,

Gracias,

Tegucigalpa.

large number of men involved.
as

far

Tenooa,

San

away

as

Pedro

Escuintla,
Sula,

Yoro,

San ·
and

By mid-1755 a list of the salaried workers

included a
Gabriel Franco, a commander
Francisco Alvarez, engineer second class
Jose Antonio Palma, a ship captain
Father Jose Ximenez, a chaplain
Pablo Garcia, ship lieutenant
Jose Quintero,
"
"
Mat:! as de 1 Sol, "
"
Jose Oroztiza,
"
"
Juan Bautista Bayam, ship lieutenant
Luis Guasco, mathematician and head foreman
Jose Bermejo, war accountant
Toaas Antonio de Amaya, shop ke~per
Jeronimo de Ibarrueta, surgeon.9
In 1756 D!ez moved the site of the fort away from the
poor location planned originally to a much cleaner one,

Nu ne z'

"point 8 3 , " halfway bet ween the mangroves and the

port.

The plans for the low redoubt of El Real, built to

protect the construction site,
plans for the fort proper.

changed just as much as the

They once called for a shallow

moat and simple counterscape, but no covered road.

On the

western curtain, one set of plans showed an extension to
the dock, to be 150 varas long and 40 wide, with a circular
battery at the end.

This dock never came into being.10
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Main Plaza "El Real."
Main Gate.
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D!ez received orders to use the blueprints drawn up by
Aranda,

instead of the many he and Alvarez had drawn.

Expense apparently had changed the minds of the Council,
and

they

approved

the

controversial

triangular

fort.

Commenting on some of the detail of the new plans, Calderon
Quijano mentions that the gun beds would be difficult to
build,
being with a reinforcement on the interior and
exterior of brick and stone which they bring
mixed with lime and is called micula, which for
being scarce, it is necessary to take advantage
of the brick, so that it will be a permanent
wall with a lot of resistance .. 11
On March 13, 1756, Alonzo de Arcos Moreno appointed
Don Juan de la Rosa y Barba to the head foremanship of
0 mo a ,

t he f i r s t

mo v e i n r e p 1 a o in g Di e z Navar r o •

In a

letter, Arcos stated that Diez had been at the site for
over a year, accomplishing nothing except to spend money.
Arcos divided Diez' engineering position between Gabriel
Franco,

Captain

of

Artillery,

and

Francisco

Alvarez,

Ordinary Engineer, and gave the military command to Rosa y
Barba.

D!ez moved to the

pa.lace. 12

cap~tal

to work on the governor's

Arcos' letter is believed to have been written

in anger or jealousy, for D!ez went on to become one of the
lea.ding men in the Kingdom
Garcia de

of Guatema.la.13

Fulgencio

Solis replaced Pa.nta.le6n Ibanez Cuevas as

governor of Honduras,

taking office on June 6.

Martinez then completed the move to replace nlez,

Jose

receiving

57

the post or Lieutenant or the Royal Exchequer at Omoa.
Drez, as mentioned above, returned to Guatemala. City.
During the years 1757-1758 no orders were issued to
actuall1 begin the construction, so the workers instead
began searching for materials and continued to labor on El
Real.

These were,

in effect,

non-productive

jobs, and

Alvarez, like Diez, found himself accused of laziness for
the la.ck of evidence or work being done.

Alvarez spent

pa.rt of his time drawing plans for a .fort, producing two:

·•

his "Plano
del Puerto y Sitio de San Fernando de Omoa." of
.
Jun e 1 0 , 1 7 5 7 , s h.o we d a.11 t he wo r k done t o d at e •
had been built,

E 1 Re a l

though not as originally planned.

walls had been closed by October 18,

The

1756, and all the

bulwarks scaled down to half-bulwarks, set in an irregular
pattern to follow the contour of the land.

Two bulwarks

protected the north side--"Santo Cristo de Esquivias" and
"Santa

Mrba.ra"--and

"Purisima 9oncepci6n."

two
El

the

south--"San

Real

had a

Gabriel" and

ca.pa.city for
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cannon, though only 26 twelve-, eighteen-, and twenty-fourpounders
rear.

po~nted

toward the sea. and 6 four-pounders to the

The circular battery at the end of the dock remained

strictl1 on paper, so its capacity for eight cannon meant
nothing.

The foreward curtain measured three varas thick,

and the rest only one vara.

The gun mounts had been lined

to one half vara of thickness with brick,
recoil

damage.14

to ease any
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"Puerto de S.n Fernando de Omoa."
The port of San Fernando de Omoa,
situated on the coast of Honduras, at
an altitude of 15°, 45 minutes from
the mouth of the gulf of Santo Tomas
de Castilla. Seventeen castillian
leagues. Luis Dfez Navarro.
[Ascribed to Francisco Alvarado
because of the shape of the fort.]
Serv. Hist. Mil. Madrid; sign 5.171;
P-b-11-10, hoja la, in Zapatero, p. 152.
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Alvarez' second map merely showed the location of the
redoubt on the coast.

It did, however, point out a place

for a torre6n, a small auxiliary fort to flank any ship
entering the harbor, which he thought should be built on
the outside point, detailed as "point G," probably
point 83.

N~fiez'

That, in effect, started the idea for such an

aid, for which several plans later materialized, though it,
like the dock, never did. 1 5
showed a square fort,

Both of Alvarez' plans still

because apparently Aranda's plans for

a triangular one had not arrived yet.
In 1756 Arcos ordered the construction of a road, to
replace the one closed through a misunderstanding several
years earlier, which would connect the capital to the new
fort. 1 6

Don Pedro Truco contracted to survey and mark the

routes

a road, in essence, consisted of a cleared-out path

for mules, so making a road meant marking trees and rocks
along the route.

The Ayuntamiento of Guatemala agreed to

bear the cost, and raised 17,000 pesos for the project--a
sizeable
survey,

sum

for

those

times.

After Truce's

original

local corregimientos had to do a more careful

clearing of the track, and maintain the right-of-way.

At

least two companies formed for this purpose, in Chiquimula,
and in Comayagua.

The new road, Arcos reported, would open

new lands for the Kingdom, as it traversed very fertile
areas of Honduras.

The new population in these lands, in
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turn, could maintain the road, in the long run paying for
the initial cost in improved trade. 1 7

The total length of

the road was 122 leaguea.18
In June of 1757, Arcos reported to the Council the
discovery of much-needed rook in three different areas.
Rook,

used in the foundations,

had to be hauled in from

great distances, being very scarce locally.
found,

It could be

according to Arcos, in the port of Sal Chico, twelve

leagues

windward and at

two other locations

seventeen

leagues the opposite way, leeward, in the Rro del Golfo and
Santo Tomas del Castillo.

Lime, used in making mortar,

just about anywhere. 1 9

could be found

On the eighth of

October, 1758, Franco and Alvarez sent Arriaga a drawing of
the completed temporary redoubt, which had been copied from
one by Pietro Cataneo Senese, with the exception of one
added

bulwark.

The

interior

of

the

redoubt

had

been

christened Plaza de Armas San Francisoo. 20
As a result of the rapid work of Don Juan de Fuentes
Trillo,

who

October

5,

foundations

rose to
1758,2 1
0£

the

the post

of Master Bricklayer on

Alvarez

reported

main fort

the

finishing

following

month,

the
on

November 12, and even sent plans showing what had been done
since 1752.

These plans were the first

triangular

fort,

but

unofficial

advance

apparently

notice,

had

being

to

been

entitled

show

drawn

the

on an

"Projected

plans"--the official order to build apparently had not yet

6J

Wa. ,, ) Moa..\-

I_£

~

I

C..o\Je.~c~

\Ala.\\(..""~~

r

rel;\~

zr!:---------------

=&;

"Plano del Fuerte"
Plan of the fort that is being built for the protection of this
port of San Fernando de Omoa on the coast of Honduras according
to the condition in which today it is found. San Fernando de
Omoa, and December 25 of 1774. Jph. Gonzalez Ferminor. This is
a copy of the original. New Establishment, February 1, 1775.
Navarro. AG!, Sevilla; sign. Mapas y Planos, Guatemala 149,
in Zapatero, p. 157.
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arrived!

But when Aroos visited Omoa the rollowing March,

he remarked that progress had been slow in the four years
Alvarez had worked there,

he could see almost no change.

The great supplies of rock either did not exist or had not
been

exploited,

for

none

at

all

had

been

stockpiled.

Alvarez had no better relations with Arcos than D!ez had
had ea.rlier1

the Captain-general asked Arriaga. to send a

new engineer to replace Alvarez, whom he considered just as
lazy as nrez.

He appointed Captain-commander Jose Antonio

Palma to replace Franco as military leader, in an effort to
push Alvarez into accomplishing some work.22
Official plans finally arrived on the 18th of September
of

1759,

and

location.

showed

the

Projected

projected fort
plans

fortification system for the port,
the outside point. 2 3

in the desired

detailed

the

entire

including the torrecSn on

By December,

Alvarez had finished

halt of the foundations for the bulwarks, the rest of the
groundwork ending the following September.

Two months

later the walls of the forward stories and rooms could be
reported as done.2~
Death continued to plague the government in Guatemala.
Mariscal del Campo D. Alonzo de Arcos y Moreno de la Orden
de Santiago, who had taken over from Montaoz, died in 1760.
His replacement, Fermndez de Heredia, had been promoted to
Field Marshall statue when he moved up from the military
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leadership or Nicaragua and Honduras.

Fernandez eagerly

pushed for the fort's completion,

and requested a full

report

date.

or

the

work

done

to

that

Joa~

Menz de

Baamonte assumed the governorship or Honduras on June 25,
1761, having been appointed the previous October 12.
replaced Interim Governor Franco,

He

who had run the show

after Fulgencio Garc!a Sol!s died. 2 5
Joa~

When

Antonio Palma

took

over

the

military

leadership or Omoa, he passed on Fernandez' request for a
full report to Alvarez.

Alvarez had sevei-al plans drawn,

one on a scale of eighty varas dated September 17, 1759,
through December 31,

1760,

and another dated September 18,

1759, on a scale of 80 varas and a profile of 40 showing
all the work done until then.
one from July 1,

1760,

He had two projected plans,

on a scale of 80 varas and 40 or

profile, the other from October 1, 1766, on the same scale.
The last set had larger detail, the profile being done in
25

varas,

and

dated

September

18

through

December

1,

1760. 2 6
One or · the most dynamic personalities on the staff at
Omoa proved to be Captain-commander Palma.
is quite extensive,
faults.

He

His biography

as his good points almost equalled his

apparently arrived

on

the

scene

as

a

ship

captain, and proceeded to purchase an hacienda at nearby
Cuyamel.

By the time he had risen to the military command,

he ran a store,

selling food to the workers at exhorbitant
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He began supplying himself with cheap or free

prices.

labor by appointing recruits in the guards to "hacienda
duty," as well as dipping into the civilian work force and
slave pool quite liberall7.

This caused man7 officials in

Comayagua to complain to the Audiencia that

Palma spent

more time on hie ranch than at the work on the fort.
A Royal edict on May 8, 1759 named him as one of many
officers involved in smuggling with the British.
later,

on September 30,

1761,

Two years

three civilians lodged an

official complaint, cosigned by four military captains,
accusing Palma of requesting a militia of 50 men, and then
using it only to work on his farm.27

'While a normal tour

of duty at Omoa lasted only two months, many had spent more
than six months at Cuyamel,

without

extra pay or

even

license to leave on a visit to their families.28
The complaint requested the government to exonerate the
militias from such misuse,
even

visit

their

families,

as the men so used could not
let

alone

feed

usually consisted of credit in Palma's store,
merchandise sold at extremely high prices.
plaintiffs

won their

case,

because

them.

Pay

where the

Apparently the

Palma received

his

marching orders, along with a judgment to repay all men who
worked at his ranch.

Palma's ranch and slaves became Royal

property, and he lost his position as commander at Omoa to
Francisco

Alvarez.

At

the

same

time,

Juan de Fuentes
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Trillo

we.a

promoted

from

master

bricklayer

to

head

foreman. 2 9
Concern over the safety of the construction site arose
when the British declared war on Spain on January 2,

1762.

Serious trouble with the woodcutters in Belize erupted that
year;

the British occupied Havana on August 12, after a

seventy-day

fight

October 6.30

with

its

Mani la

populace;

fell

on

Fernandez de Heredia wrote in an official

report:
I can do no less than bring to your
consideration, to pass on to His Majesty, that
if there is any breaking with the court of
England, boats of competent strength should be
sent to Omoa to defend the fort there.
It is
very undefended, and it is necessary to guard
it to prevent any insults the English can do
while it is in its present state.
Even though,
as the Engineers have pointed out, including
Don Luis Diez Navarro's report, a small fort
should be built on the point they call
"outside", to defend the bay, i t will be
necessary to send at least one frigate of the
squadron, with another from Havana.
This will
avoid illnesses and the ships can leave and
refurnish with victuals and people.
Orders
should be given to this effect immediately.3 1
This request would be difficult to comply with,

as

Spain had scarcely enough warships to defend existing forts
in New Spain and Central America.
hand,

had a large squadron at Jamaica purely for offensive

purposes.
place,

England, on the other

Consequently the English moved from place to

never

recommended

losing

in

halting the

could be thus gainedz

strength.
construction.

As

a

solution,

D!ez

Several advantages

the existing foundations could be
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tested by weathering, and materials could be replenished
and stockpiled, and a new location

could be studied for

the placement of an anchoring shoe, as one or more of the
existing ones had proved insufficient, due to the rockiness
of the terrain.
effect,

Evidently this recommendation went into

because the work stopped in 1763.

The soldiers

remained to protect the site, as can be seen in the account
of the salaries paid in 1764.3 2
to

stop

work

February 10,
Omoa.

arrived,
1763,

But by the time the orders

the Peace of Paris,

signed on

had ended the war without mishap at

The first news of construction after the cessation

came in November, 1764, when Diez passed by while working
on the evacuation of the Rro Tinto area in compliance with
article 17 of the Peace Pact:
It was found necessary to resurface the
foundation facing the sea, because the waves had
eroded the protecting a.nchorag~ and threatened
to undermine the construction.5j
Alvarez had predicted such an event when he began to build
according to the plans.
In the same report,

which included a set

showing all work already done,

of plans

D!ez reported the discovery

of a limestone deposit in the hill near the village,
could be used for making lime.
opened a quarry,

which

The construction workers

thus eliminating the need to travel the

seven or eight leagues to the ca.ya for mortar lime. Diez
requested

several

repairs

needed

for

the

forts

of
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Concepc~n

Inmaculada

at San Juan, and at Golfo Dulcea

"It

is indispensable to maintain them, and to the repairs they
need,

new projects need to be added. 11 34

time

Heredia

asked

replace Alvarez,

Arriaga

to

send

At about the ea.me
a

nev

engineer

to

whom Arcos had fired when the convenient

break the war provided came along.

Alvarez apparently had

died at the fort shortly after that.35

Diez, too old and

weak, could not move back and resume the work there.
Ac c o rd i n g

t o

Zap at e r o ,

Infant r y

Captain

D.

To ma s

Hermenegildo de Arana, the Governor of Honduras, wrote an
account

of

the

history

of Omoa,

dated Hay

30,

1764.36

Writing about the size of the fortification needed, Arana
stated that the minimum guard should be of four companies
of 100 men each--mulattos or mestizos of an area no more
than 80 leagues from Omoa, so they would be used to the
climate.

Such men could be worth ten foreigners, who would

succumb rapidly to

the diseases

of the area.

families could also serve as spies for the fort,
any

discrepancies

through

their

kinsmen

in

Their

reporting
the

guard.

Arana did not believe either the site chosen for the fort
or the type of construction to be the best;
been built on top of the hill,
landscape.
defense.

it should have

where it could dominate the

As it sat, the hill could be a detriment to its
Only a torre6n with a battery or cannon should

have been put on the beachfront.

But since this had not
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"A chart of the Harbour and Port of St. Fernan.o de Omoa."
1779-1780. Institute of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica. In Zapatero,
p. 192.
A note says that the outside walls were ten feet high, the
garrison wall twenty-eight feet high and seventeen thick.
The town
was between the governor's house and the garrison.
The structure
to the right of the fort was a kiln, and the battery consisted only
of a couple of trenches.
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d

'

d
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been done,
the

the hill should be levelled and used as fill for

swamps

in

the

immediate

expressed disappointment,

surroundings.

Aranda

"because the Fort that was being

built, though the Plans say otherwise, is a badly-formed
Ga. r i t6 n " ( o u t p o st ) • 3 7

Chapter Sixt

Until

recently,

contradicting

The Labor Aspect

there

ha.a

been

no

solid

evidence

the idea that before the purchase of black

slaves in 1755, only white labor had been used to build the
fort.

But Mario Argueta,

in his article "Los Constructores

del Castillo de San Fernando de Omoa 1759-1775," states
that the work used Indian, Negro, and mestizo labor.1

Moat

of the Indians used apparently came from Yoro and Tela,
areas populated by Jicaque Indians. 2

As early as 1681,

Francisco de Castro Ayala started the paperwork to move
fifty Indians from each town within a forty-five league
radius

of

Omoa

to

build

the

fort.

Under

orders

from

Sevilla, he also prepared to transfer fifty blacks to Omoa,
as the fort had to be completed within five years.3
Evidence

0£ official Indian labor usage still remains

scarce, but indirect proof does exist.

In 1770 a group of

Indians complained about the cost of their trip to and from
Omoa. They had not received as much pay as their ladino
counterparts for the same distance traveled.

The complaint

stated that many had died because they had only been used
to clean swamps and grow milpas (cornfields) and jiquilite
(dyes)

for the commander's own profit.

labor at Omoa in horror,

The Indians held

mainly because of the distance ·

7I
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from their families, the climate, and the length or the
required stay. Ji
In

1762 Miguel

Hidenze and Luis

residents of Tegucigalpa,
they

could

not

Manuel Rivera,

complained to the governor that

operate

their

mines

because

the

repartimiento (governmental division of Indian labor) to
San Fernando de
force.5

Omoa. virtually

wiped out their labor

That the repartimiento could seriously alter the

operations of the mines can be questioned,

though, because

the Honduras mines did not use very much Indian labor.6
Other complaints also prove Indian labor usage at Omoa:
the inhabitants of Macholoa (in Ten-0oa) wrote that all
their

tribute

payers

had been sent to Omoa,

and only

returned to die, after having been paid half the salary
agreed on.

Jalapa, Salis.ca and Yams.la also sent Indians to

the fort.7

In 1760 the Audiencia of Guatemala ordered the

governor of Gracia.a not to send more Indians to Omoa,
though the governor by-passed this order,

using Indians as

porters for bread or guns through Olanchito and Comayagua.
The Audiencia's report mentions that in Piraera thirty
Indians had died as a result

or

Omoa labor;

in Erandique, and twelve in Gualmoaca.8

seventeen died
That same year

Luis D!ez Navarro wrote of the Indiana working on his
project, clearly stating they only opened a road from Omoa
to Quimistan, and did not work on the construction.9

The

village of Nuestra Senora de la Candelaria, by the junction
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of

the

rivers

completely,

Chamelec6n

because

its

and

Choloma,

inhabitants

all

working on the construction of the fort,

disappeared
le.ft

or

died

according to Jose

Mar!a Tojeira. 10
Argueta's article is the first to deal with the Indian
labor in Omoa, and as such

has several problems.

Argueta

states that after 1752-1753, African slaves or mestizos
gradually replaced the Indians,

but all the documents used

to prove the existence of such labor, except for Governor
Castro Ayala's orders in 1680,
Castro

Ayala's

orders

were

are from
fifty

1760 and later.

years

before

any

suggestion or, and sixty years before, any concrete plans
for the fort at Omoa were made.

Then Argueta mentions a

petition in 1802 for payment for a group of twenty La Campa
Indians who went to unload several ships that never showed
up.

They were not paid, even though two died en route. 11
Because neither the Indians nor the Spaniards could

cope very well with the climate of Omoa,

the government

purchased blaok slaves to deal with the heavy work of the
construction.

The exact figures and dates of the purchases

are very confusing, if all the data is considered.
dates the first

purchase in 1771,

Argueta

with the payment

55,770 pesos for 217 blacks of both sexes.

of

A 40,000 peso

advance had been made to one Joseph Melchor de Ugalde,
bonded by Juan Fermin de Ayoienena.

When Melchor died,
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Joseph Pifiol took up the account and received the remaining
55,770 pesos.

All three men belonged to the Consulado in

Guatemala, and the price paid per slave followed the Real
Compafiia del Asiento de Negros scale from Puerto Rioo1

260

"pesos fuertes~ per black, 2~0 pesos ror mulecones (seven
to ten year-olds from Africa), and 215 pesos for muleques
(female
That

mulecones).1 2
same

year

(1771)

the

Asiento de

Havana sent seventy blacks to Omoa,
ill,

and one dying en route. 1 3

Pitt also supplied
100 slaves.

Negros

de

la

five being rejected as

Robert Hodgson and William

blacks to the fort, with a contract for

Their prices seem to have been somewhat better

than those of the Asiento1
140 pesos per slave, in lots or 50 men, 30 women,
10 muleques, and 10 mulequas
16~ pesos per slave, in lots or 100 men
120 to 140 pesos for mulequesas only, depending
on their size
204 pesos for Gold Coast men
196 pesos for Gold Coast mulecones
170 to 190 pesos for Gold Coast muleconas. 1 ~
But Argueta's

tally of the slave population differs1

first contract slaves----~------204 caravalies
(from Nigeria)
second contract slaves----------232 mondongos
(from Congo)
third contract slaves----------- 98 caravalies
fourth contract slaves---------- 57 caravalies
owned by Palma-------------------23
total
15

ITT

Harvey

Meyer

provides

another

set

or

figures.

According to him, all the slaves had been purchased from
Jasper Hall in Jamaica at 204 or

164 pesos

per

male

75
(depending on their condition) and 140 pesos per female.
Hall

charged

purchase of
another

20

pesos for

100 slaves

installment

on

on

deliver7. 1 6

each

September 5,

November

2,

The

1755,

1767

first

preceded

or

100,

as

certified by Vicente Mart!nez, interim superintendant at
the

fort.

In a

September 5, 1755,
concern for

letter

signed

b1

Arcos

y

Moreno

on

the officials involved emphasized their
If blacks

that kind of dealing.

had to be

purchased, care must be taken that no smuggling take place
in the prooesss

a Spanish ship must be used, if available.

Only the slaves could be transported,

and no other item of

trade allowed on board. 1 7
Arcos y Moreno received a

letter from Hall through

Colonel Robert Hodgson on June 22,

1756, and the following

day he told Phelipe Romano y Herrera, fiscal counselor,
Juan Antonio Rodr!guez de Ribas,
Llano,

treasurer,

to

issue

accountant,

the

payment

and Manuel de
and

passports

necessary to deliver the slaves and for the return of the
ship.

He approved a price of 184 pesos per slave,

blacks of good disposition,

delivered in good health.

for
Once

again the officials issued a warning about the care to be
exersized that nothing other than slaves arrive on the
ship,

and that the ship land only at Omoa.18

The slavery at Omoa

was a

curious one,

however.

Normally slaves received a food and clothing ration and
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were allowed to hire out after hours to supplement their
income.

At Omoa, they received cash to feed themselves,

a

cloth ration, money to make their clothes, and a tobacco
ration.

So to some extent they could be considered more as

indentured servants than as slaves. 1 9

According to Rubio

sanchez, slaves were given one peso and a tobacco or food
ration.20

In 1758, the superintendant reported that the

245 slaves belonging to the deposed military leader Palma
had been apportioned off between Palma's estate (by then a
royal

hacienda)

completion,

and

fort. 21

the

After

the

fort's

these slaves received their freedom, and formed

the basis for the present day village of Omoa.
D! e z '

pre d i c t i on

t hat

t he

£ or t

wo u 1 d

a t i mu 1 at e

an

increase in the population or the surrounding areas came
true to a degree.

Licenciado Domingo L6pez de

interim Captain-general,

Urr~jola,

issued an order on January 16,

1772, for the regularization of all new towns and poblados
founded in the areas around Omoa.? 2
The

town

or Omoa grew

slowly:

founded in 1752,

it

included the Royal Treasury building, a chapel, a hospital,
a couple of stores and warehouses,
and

barracks for

people

connected

though. 2 3

the

officers and enlisted

with the

Bancroft

the commandant's house,

states

considerable population,

men.

Only

construction lived there,
the

town

"soon

contained

a

and became the outlet for the

commerce or eastern Guatemala."24

An anonymous

map drawn
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"Plan of the Fort, Port, and town of Omoa. Omoa, the 17th of April
of 1779. Agust:ln Crame." Serv. Geog. del Eje"rcito, Madrid; sign.
lm-8a-2a-a 134, in Zapatero, p. 174. Note says the upper portion of
the town was for blacks only. The lower portion only was called the
town of Omoa. The plan shows Crarne's suggested batteries to increase
the cannonfire of the fort.
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in 1775 shows a town of 75 white families and a.bout
black slaves.25

Two years later,

~00

Joseph Ferminor reported

to his superiors in Guatemala that the total number of
inhabitants came to 1 ,3ll3t
personnel.

1 ,029 blacks and 31Ji military

In 1798 the Chaplain Juan de Pineda compiled a

list of inhabitants that totaled 1,099. 2 6
Omoa.

had

a

church,

a

police station,

By that time,
a

hospital,

a

commandant's office, several ranch houses, a carpenter's
shop, a blackemithy, and a small number or houses. 2 7

D!ez Navarro drew up a set of plans
the

position

of

the

in 1768, showing

houses and other buildings

of

the

village. 2 8 The plans are especially valuable for showing
the location of the buildings inside of El Real.

Outside

the fort, the town consisted of a shop, the blacksmithy,
the

blaok

slaves'

quarters

of

the

purchases (they were kept separate),

first

and

second

the lime and brick

kilns, the cattle yards, the engineers' homes, the powder
stores,

and the guardhouses.

Mentioning his orders of

Maroh 25, 1757, which stated "The King orders the fort be
made according to the original plan of the
Aranda," Diez

ma.de

sure his plans fit

the

Conde de
originals

perfectly. 2 9
Strict

laws

construction

regulated

area

and

life

towns

and

near

conditions

forts.

Were

in
a

the
fort

separated by more than one league from the nearest city or
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town, it had, by law, to have a priest with a salary of 130
pesos per year, or at least equal to that of an ordinary
soldier.

Were the oonstruotion closer to tovn but

longer than a week,

lasting

the governor should provide for the

holy sacraments for his

workers.30

Work could not last

longer than eight hours in a single day,

though this could

be arranged to fit the desires of the head engineer.
could,

for instance,

He

leave out the hottest part of the day

by working from five a.m.

to one p.m.31

Every Saturday

work had to stop one hour early so the paymaster could
attend to distributing the salaries of the workers.

Food

had to be provided, though not necessarily for free.

The

head

the

engineer

did

all

the

hiring and

firing,

and

Captain-general set the wages, after consulting with the
head engineer and his accurate records of eaoh worker's
ability.3 2

Zamora provides the following pay scale used in

Guatemala, though he does not make it olear how long the
pay period was:
in 1717, infantry in the Guardia de Palacio-----8pesos
mounted Gua.rds----------------------~-15
in 1750, a Commandante de Campo----------------30
an alferez (quartermaster)------------25

a

sergent--~-------------~------------15

a corporal----------------------------12
a footsoldier-------------------------8pesoa.33
in 1768, a lieutenant--------------------------~8

an

alf8rez~-----------~-------------~-38

a standardbearer----------------------34
troops (footsoldiers)----------------- 8
mounted soldiers----------------------15
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These

salaries did not

have · to be earned,

however.

Anyone with the right connections and the right price could
The sale or

arrange for a career in the armed foroee.

military rank was a common practice, and the price paid
depended on the position sought and the ability of the
purchaser to pay.
oost 800 pesos1

In general,

a lieutenant-colonelship

a captaino7, 201

quartermaster's post,

a lieutenantship,

18;

a

15 pesos.34

Other laws governing the defense system called for all
fort blueprints had to be submitted to the Council of the
Indies

first,

circumstances,

with

forms,

a

sheet

of

specifications,

and reasons for the building.35

The

engineers had to personally lay out plans and lines, and
the Captain-generals to assist in the construction,

seeing

the construction to a completion as quickly as possible.
Workers

could

not

hire

out

for

any

other

job until

discharged by the fort adminiatration.36
Every building in the near vicinity of a fort had to be
demolished and the owners reimbursed by the Real Hacienda.
No one could
special

make drawings

permiseion.37

All

of Spanish forts
ships

in

the

except by

harbor had to

salute the fort with a small mortar upon arriving, and if
they failed to do so, would be immediately attacked.38
king

forbade

foreigners

fortification system.39

to

enter

into

any

The

Spanish

Chapter Sevens

The Second Construction Period

In his report to Arriaga, Salazar recommended a small
torre6n on the northwest point of the beach,
origin a 11 y p 1 an n e d t o bu i l d t he fort.

where D!ez had

The t or r e6 n sh o u 1 d

have twelve and eighteen pound cannon, and would flank any
ships entering the harbor.
the

recommendation,

Apparently Arriaga forwarded

seconded

Diez and

by

the

engineer

Antonio Murga, to General Cermeno, Director of Engineers in
Spain.

The latter returned the plans because the copy he

received did not include topography
troops,

defense

He considered the torrecSn far

against

assault

against naval aggression,

should

profile and

be

been

by

land,

but

it might be a

too weak for
as

a

device

very good idea.

1768 showed the point where the

D!ez' report to Arriaga in
torre6n

plan to house

necessary if the torre6n were more than 1,000 varas

from the fort.
an7

or a

built.

elevation for

His

plans

the project

presented

a

on a scale of 30

vars.a, plans quite adequate for a good idea of the area,
despite

Cermeiio's

opinion to

the

contrary. 1

Cermeno drew

up a version of a torroon as one possible for Omoa in
a

complete tort,

independently,

reduced in size,

1769:

but capable of acting

despite its being subject to San Fernando. 2

Even though the construction of one

or

these small forts

did receive approval and funding, i t was never built, and
never again did it attract attention.3
8]
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Murga rapidly caught on to the causes of the delays in
the construction of the fort,
between a
materials.

he could see the time lapse

request and an approval and
He drew up a plan and map

or

the

delivery of

all that had been

built at the time he took over, and sent it to Guatemala on
the 22nd or February,

1768.4

The following year he

proposed altering the plans or the fort, placing the main
entrance at the rear or southeast side,

instead of the sea

or northeast side, in an effort to avoid entrapment by a
besieging army.
two gates&
succor.

The typical bulwarked system called for

a main one, and one called "del Socorro," or of

The original plans for Omoa had one main door on

the seaside and an auxiliary aide door on the southeast
side.

All traffic to San Pedro Sula had to march around

the fort before entering, a circumstance which could prove
fatal in case of a siege, as reinforcements most likely
would come from that direction.

Therefore Murga proposed

re-making the auxiliary door as the main one, and opening
another auxiliary door on the third side, the one closest
to the San Pedro road.

That way no door opened on the

battle side of the fort, and one faced each exit route from
the fort.

Drez approved the plan;

the new door was opened

in the area previously housing the chapel, so the chapel
was then moved to the opposite side, where the main door
had been.

Arriaga, upon hearing of the change, expressed

the great appreciation the king had for all the efforts to
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make it the best defense in the area.5

But he included a

note of concern £or the health of the men at the site:
Nonetheless we notify you of the King's
resolution concerning the engineers available
for duty at Omoa:
a rotation system should be
set up, using trained personnel used to the
climate, taking turns as foreman to relieve the
directing Engineer, thus to prevent any
detriment to the health of the Europeans in
that port. 6
Toward the end of 1769 a rash of diseases hit Omoa very
hard, and the Audiencia requested the Council of the Indies
to send six military engineers to serve on rotation at
Omoa, and a surgeon to help the ill.
Though an attempt had been made to stop troop movements
and rotation of militia duty to Omoa,
had to serve there.

In

some militias still

1777 Captain Alfonso Mercadillo

took two companies from Golfo Dulce to Omoa:
half of the trip to Bodegas,
way. 7

they marched

then sailed the rest of the

They had little to serve with,

though Garcia Pelaez

included in his Memorias a list of what he considered the
inadequate armaments at Omoa,8

The fact that the personnel

at the fort did not meet adequate standards either can be
seen in a report written on December 1,

1769:

as far as the help, it is reduced to asking for
five helpers of the artillery;
four subaltern
officers of the cavalry;
two engineers, one a
chief and the other a subaltern;
two
sergeants, four corpora.ls of artillery and
twenty artillery men, practical all, of
cultivated customs, whose number is considered
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necessary for the action seen in Omoa, or other
forts in the Kingdom, which are needed to
defend adequately Spain's intereats.9
The new captain-general, Pedro Salazar, wrote in 1771
that

ordinary engineer Captain Lorenzo Alvarado had died,

and Extraordinary

engineer Lieutenant

Joa~

Gonz,lez

Ferminor had fallen ill, as well as Juan Dastie,
same rank.

The only engineer who remained in a condition

to work was Jos~ Alejandro.10
died,

of the

Draftsman Joa~ de Medula

and Murga joined the ranks of the ill,

though he

recovered and returned to Omoa to work on the circular
curtain and storehouses.

By the end of 1772 Murga had

succeeded in advancing the construction to the point of
closing all the walls.

The northeast side and the three

bulwarks fast neared completion also.
Because of the change of the main entrance,
delay

occurred.

No

notice

another

of approval had arrived by

August of 1772 for the change, though the order had been
sent on the 28th of March of that year.

Several openings

had been left in the walls, in case the Council disapproved
of

the

changes,

allowing
different

workers

and
to

to .facilitate the construction by
carry

materials

work areas outside the fort.

in

from

several

These openings

appeared on the plans Murga drew up on August 28, 1772.

11

They provided an interesting sidelight to the current
knowledge

of

the forts

traces

of filling-in

or these

access openings gave rise to rumors of the existence of
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torture chambers.

In later stages of the fort's history it

was used as a prison,

during which time these "torture

chambers" supposedly came into use.

There is nothing to

prove or disprove these rumors, of course, but the drawings
of the openings on a map as access gates should lead one to
disbelieve them. 12
Salazar died on May 5, 1771, and the Audienoia named
Juan Gonzalez Bustillo as his interim replacement.

The

next year work finally recommenced officially after the
1763 war break.

Arcos 1 Moreno took over from Gonzalez

temporarily, and gave the orders to begin building again.
That year Jose Gonzalez Ferminor became chief engineer,
replacing Murga, who left for Spain in 1773.
The July 29,

1773, earthquake that destroyed Guatemala

and forced the moving of the capital to its present site
did not much affect the work at the fort.

Diez reported

the request by Joaqufn del Castillo, the fort accountant,
to expand the size of his office spaoe.13

The new Captain-

general, Capitan de Reales Guardia.a Espanolas y Mariscal
del Campo de los Real es Ejeroi tos Don Mart!n de Mayorga, de
la

0 rd e n d e A1 can t a r a ,

construction.

s ent

3 0 , 0 0 0 p e s o s t o £ in i s h the

He requested a complete report or anything

needed, but Ferminor, too sick to answer, did not comply
immediately.

He did eventually draw up a set of plans
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showing just what had been done up until the time of his
takeover. 1 4
On January 25,

177~,

the Council asked to see plans

showing the advancement of the construction at Omoa,
order

to

start

planning

sending the artillery,

for

outfitting

and other supplies.

the

in

garrison,

Because of bad

times with the court of England, they feared war again, a
fear that came true in 1779.
slowness of the construction,
personnel

at

December 20,

the

fort.

1774,

The Council worried about the
and about the quality of the

In a

letter

to

Arriaga

dated

D. Silvestre Abarca lists all of the

engineers assigned to work on the Omoa project:
Engineering Director
Second Engineer

Second Engineer
Ordinary Engineer
Extraordinary Engineer
Extraordinary Engineer
Extraordinary Engineer

Luis Diez Navarro
Lieut. Col. Joaquin Casaviella
(who never arrived from Spain,
and was replaced by Lieut. Col.
Antonio Sampere)
Lieut. Col. Antonio Marin
Captain Sim6n Desnaux
Lieut. Juan Dastie
Lieut. Jose Gonz~lez Ferminor
Jose Alejandro. 1

A new set of plans drawn on February 1, 1775, showed
the advances in the construction:
been finished,

the main door had not

but Ferminor (the senior engineer at the

fort) had completed the officers' and troops' quarters,

the

Castellano's apartments, two stores on the left of the main
door, and fifteen shops on the circular curtain.
left in the south bulwark,

A room

marked as:/f"8 on the map, had

been designated as a powder room.16

Commenting on the
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"Plan and profile of the Fort of San Fernando de Omoa. Omoa, the
17th of April of 1779. Agust!n Crame. This is a copy made by
Julio Albo y Helguero." Serv. Geog. del Ejercito, Madrid; sign.
LM-9a-la-a 134, in Zapatero, p. 177. The legend reads:
A
B
C
D
N
F
G

principal door
door of El Socorro
shops
chapel
powder room
circular battery
low batteries to increase firepower
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location of the powder room, Zapatero statesz
the 8th store, adjacent to the interior angle
of the first wall or the southern bulwark, is
disposed toward the powder room, thus showing
the dados on the ventilation shafts opening
onto the arms plaza--and one with the shaft
curiously open at the same angle as the wall,
an irregularity which we esteem very
adventuresome and dangerous, because in the
case or a siege, an incendiary bomb could cause
an explosion in the roomr indisputably this is
a techni1,l deficiency which we can not readily
explain.
According to Ferminor's 1775 plans,

the shop with the

auxiliary door (on the San Pedro Sula side) shared space
with the chapel.

Just outside the southern bulwark, at

"point O," a lime kiln had been opened.

Because of this,

for some time the southern bulwark was nicknamed "the one
of

the

kiln,"

even though

the

shortly after its construction.

kiln

had

been filled

in

Ferminor also made a five-

note explanation on his planes
1 • a 11 sh op s had been fin i s h e d "c on e 1 c a n6 n a
tree rosoas"
2. the fort now rose to the level of the
majeaterial cord, ready to begin the work
on the parapets
3. the map showed how much or the counterscape
had been finished, and that all of the foundation
had been done
4. the eastern bulwark, r/f20 on the map, had been
completed, and already had two guardhouses
finished
5.
the southern bulwark,:/t.21 on the map, was half
completed. its
Mayorga wrote a letter to Arriaga in 1773, stating that
"this

work

is

found

artillery • • • • "1 9

now

in

the

state

to

mount

the

The next year Mayorga wrote to

Joe~
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Galvez,

who

had

replaced

Arriaga

as

Secretary

or

the

Indies, that two more engineers should be sent to Omoa, not
counting Ferminor--and noted the arrival at the capital or
Sim6n Desnaux, a captain or engineers.

Then on the sixth

or January, 1775, he communicated to the court that he had
sent the engineer to examine and inform me or
what is necessary for the defense of the plazas
he requested thirty-three cannon and gun
carriages and other various utensils.
In the
very probable event that the enemy bring
mortars, it is necessary to have in the fort at
least eight mortars and the corresponding bombs.
There should be at least 1100 men in the garris~8
and two artillery companies or fifty men each.
The last official notice mentioning the construction of
the fort came with another letter from Mayorga to Galvez in
1775:
With the date of April the last I am informed
by the commandant of Omoa that he has mounted
on the wall £acing the sea of the castle six
cannon or brass of twenty-four pounds and two
culverins of twelve,
and that at the end or
the same month he will have it with all its
artillery and placed on a regular defense
schedule;
that in all the present month they
will conclude the landfills or the two
collateral bulwarks.2 1
Mayorga projected a total completion date of June, 1778.
The bulk of the construction had been done, but the bulwark
fill-in had nots

carts and drivers would have to be hired

for that job.
In January,
replace interim
Ferminor,

1775,

Antonio sanchez went

military

commander

head engineer still,

felt

to Omoa to

Francisco

Aybar.

the Royal Hacienda

9I

could afford to buy carts for
landfills.

Several

could do the

the slaves to use on the

others disagreed,

job by hand,

feeling

that

slaves

with baskets, probably.

argument went on for years. 22

The

The landfills apparently

rose to a workable degree by Christmas, 1777, though an
anonymous map from early 1775 shows the work to have been
completed much as the fort stands today.
had no landfills,

but the

completed on all three sides.
de

a

tree

esplanades

Ferminor,

and of the

in

work

Mayorga assured Galvez that

had been

The stores had been finished

roscas,, (see note 18) and

shelters. 2 3
parapets,

upper

The counterscape

1777,

covered as

bomb

wrote of incomplete

needed

on the

landfills.

these two details would be

completed as soon as possible.

In the meantime, six 24-

pound cannon adorned the front wall,

along with two 12-

"caliber" culebrinas. 2 4
The following year Diez Navarro sent two engineers,
Sim6n Desnaux and Juan
report on its condition.

Dasti~,

to

survey

the . fort

and

An uneasy Audienoia worried over

the problems with the British in Belize, and thus for the
safety of the fort.

The engineers reported some serious

deviations from Aranda"s original construction planes
parapets had been altered slightly,
present any problems.

the

though this did not

But the builders had substituted

mortar for dirt fill-in over the shops, which might prove
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troublesome;

the foundations

were

weak

to

begin

with,

having been built over sand without any deep foundations or
anchorings.

Several

walls

especially along the front

already

curtain,

sported
where

eroded the exposed bases and foundations.
could withstand a continued cannonade:
eleven brass cannon (of twenty-four,

But the fort

Desnaux had all

eighteen,

and sixteen

fired

effect.

The over-reliance on brick instead of rock in the
walls

blueprints.

meant

stand

Besides,

serious

ca.using

deviation

any

from

ill

the

Brick could not withstand enemy cannonballs as

well as rock could,
could

another

without

sea had

pounds)

outer

simultaneously

the

cracks,

up

so the engineers did not feel the fort

under

a

sustained

artillery

attack.

sea water and constant humidity tended to soften

brick and melt the adobe,
begin with.

which had a high salt content to

Three arches over lengths of brick constituted

the structure of the stores, built one over another without
alternating, a practice which weakened the fort's basic
structure.

Both Daatie and Desnaux only gave approval to

the structure because they knew of no alternative except to
tear down the fort and begin again from the foundations.
At the time of the report the landfills had not been
even started,

because no dirt suitable for such use had

been found in the immediate area.
side,

however,

Looking at the bright

they believed the topography in some way

compensated for some of the fort's

weaknesses,

if only
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beoause of the lack of another decent landing place nearby.
The shops remained irremediably damp and humidz
three collected water at alarming rates,
engineers felt this could be fixed,
crown.

all but

though the

at some cost to the

The mangroves had reclaimed muoh of the previously

cleared areas, a fact not considered good either for the
defense or for the health of the inhabitants.

The roads to

San Pedro Sula and Guatemala also remained in a very sad
condition, probably through simple lack of use.

Desnaux

estimated the cost of repairing the eighty-one league route
to Guatemala through San Pedro Sula to be 418,450 pesos. 2 5
Brigadier de Infanter!a e Ingenier!a Mili tar D.
Crame,

Agust!n

appointed by the Council of the Indies as inspector

general of the fortifications of the Americas, produced
another evaluation of San Fernando de Omoa.26

At the time

of the report (April of 1779), only two companies guarded
Omoa,

with

an

effective

strength

of

100

menz

Crame

accurately admitted the garrison's deficiency in case of
attack that months

his assessment was to be proven true

only five months later.
The

construction

needed

serious

ref .ormsi

the

northeast curtain did not have enough cannon coverage,

and

Face

the

Two

of

the

northern

bulwark and

Face

southern could not withstand any attacks.

One

or

One solution

might be, Crame suggested, to build two separate batteries,
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connected

to

Se.n

Fernando

by

"oaponeras"

(literally,

cloaks), opening toward the sea.

This would complement the

defense

and add greatl1 to the

of these

weak spots,

firepower of the fort.

Were the redoubt of El Real torn

down, the oost of building these two batteries would only

6,ooo

amount to a.bout

The interior of the fort

pesos.

needed more "aljibe," provisioning of food e.nd water.
deeper well should be dug inside the plaza,

A

to improve the

water supply for the number of troops and animals quartered
within the fort. 2 7
The

garrison,

Crame

continued,

needed

reinforcing

It had barely 100 men, and certainly not

desperately.

enough officers&

Lieutenant Diego Duran had gone to Spain,

Captain Jose Cuf!llar and under-lieutenants Antonio Antonoti
and Gabino Martrnez to Guatemala.

Only tvo officers other

than the oastellano held commands

under-lieutenants Manuel

C l er i a c

and

J o s tS

reinf~rcements

Men~ n de z •

Guatemala could not supply

readily, being too far from the fort,

Crame suggested stationing a
troops in San Pedro Sula,
hills near the fort.

so

contingent of 400 veteran

of which 100 could remain in the

Omoa. should have 400 veteran troops,

including sixty artillerymen, and a reserve of 100 slaves
as

reinforcements.

seventy-four

Current infantry consisted of only

veterans

and

six

Spanish

corpora.ls.

The

artillery personnel included forty black slaves with no
real training,

and their weaponry he termed "loose"s

they
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only

had

twenty-six cannon

(brass,

or twenty-four and

twelve pounds), of which six needed repairs already.
the inven tor1 of forty-three iron cannon (24,

18,

12, 8,

or
4,

3, 2, and 1 pounders), twenty had not arrived, and ten of
the

remaining had

broken down.

The

men needed

14,755

bullets to bring current stock up to adequate standards,
because

only 5,945

of all

calibers filled their stock.

Instead of 400 "sixteen caliber" muskets with ba1onets,
the1 had onl1 50.

Supplies of lead,

flints,

and compounds

for making powder simply did not exist. 2 8
Ironically, in 1777, the Captain-general had tried to
stop the conscription of militias for rotation at Omoa, or
at least to stop them from going to the fort.
travelled slowly,

Because news

this did not go into effect for some

time:

Comayagua still sent eighty men per month on a

regular

basia.29

Chapter Eights

Commerce,

The Commercial Aspect

after defense the most important reason for

the fort's construction,

grew very slowly.

During the

first few years, only Royal traffic used the ports

troop

shipments, supplies, and an occasional Register ship.

Jose

de Palma arrived in 1755 in the first merchant ship to call
at Omoa, but only because a storm did not permit him to
land at Matina. 1

The first merchant ship licensed to the

port arrived the following year--the Maria under Captain
Silvestre Martinez de Ca.noba.s, from Santo Domingo. 2
Commerce tended to be a serious problem for the whole
of Guatemala.

Part of the trouble started when a treasurer

in Peru lowered the gold content of coins being minted, for
his own profit.

Guatemala appears to have borne the brunt

of

of

this

flood

counterfeit

economically from it.

coins,

and

suffered

Then Ecuadoran cacao flooded the

Mexican market, practically eliminating all Guatemalan
competition.

A worse blow came in 1620 when the King

prohibited trade with Peru;

the loss of commerce with

Havana. in 1676 proved to be the last straw.
Jauregui

sums

it

up

well

by

quoting

the

Batres
"cha.pin"

(Guatemalan) adage "Buen principio de semana. tiene el que
lo ahorca.n en lunes"--you start off a week well when you're
hanged on Monday.3
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The Peru trade had been goods

Guatemala sent tar and

dyes and cacao in return for wine, vinegar, rum, almonds
and olives.

With the lose 0£ these imports the price of

wine skyrocketed,

if only because 0£ demand.

The ban

opened the way for blatant smuggling betveen Nicaragua and
Peru, because only Nicaragua supplied Peru with pitch for
its wine casks,

and only through Guatemala could Peru

benefit directly from the Manila Galleons.4
Taxation hit Guatemalan merchants very hard.

In 1629,

Spain demanded 4,000 ducats 0£ gold annually to support the
military.

The Windward Navy was established during the War

of Succession, adding
4
2
2
1
1

reales gold on each box 0£ indigo
reales gold on each load of cacao
reales gold on each arroba of grana silvestre
real gold on each hide
real gold on each petac~ (measure) of tar,
tobacco, or sarsaparilla

to the current taxess
primicias,

alca.bala.s,

oficios vendibles,

the
the

e;obela~,
quint~

tequios,
4

on metals,

and other local fees.

diezmos,
derechos,
These all

amounted to near bankruptcy for Guatemalan merchants by the
end of the seventeenth century.5
The yearly Cadiz fleet sent at least one ship to
Honduras,

under

the

protection of

the

W'indward

Navy,

bringing wine, velvet and jewelry, and returning to Spain
with cacao, indigo, balsams, and woods.

But on the 12th or

April of 1633, the king dropped the naval protection of the
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Honduras squadron,
wares

through

forcing

the merchants to send their
With

Veracruz.

Ecuadoran cacao production,

the

development

Guatemala lost its monopol1 on

that market and had to diversify its productss
tried cotton,

sugarcane,

of the

tobacco,

planters

pitch, and alquitr6n.

The area around Trujillo produced maize, fruits, grapes,
oranges, lemons, and the rivers abounded with fish.

Cattle

also multiplied rapidly, and in later years Thomas Gage
reported

important

crops

sarsaparilla and yucca.6

of

Canna

The production of

cochineal and vanilla declined,
mineral

hides,

wealth increased.

Fistula,
jiquilite,

though precious woods and

But

the destruction

of

the

seaports by pirates after the loss of protection by the
Windward Navy hurt all commercial traffic drastically.
According

to

Rubio

&tnchez,

the

merchants' future

looked so bad that
the commercial movement during the year 1702 in
Central America can be said to have been
circumscribed in the arrival of the· ship named
"Magdalena," from Panama, which arrived at th~
port of Realejo. 7
In 1742 Guatemala imported 400,000 pesos of merchandise
from

Spain and 200,000 from

China.

That

same year it

exported 300,000 in gold and silver, 250 1 000 in cacao and
dyes, and 50,000 in miscellaneous items, thus producing a.
trade balance of zero.a
The

commercial

outlook

in

the

colonies

brightened

somewhat by 1765, with the opening of several Spanish ports
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to the Caribbean trade.

The new Bourbon king saw these

free trade reforms as the only way to restore agriculture
and

industry

in

the

colonies

to

their

previous

vigor.

Before these improvements, Guatemala had shown very low tax
profits1

in 1757, it sent only 29,000 pesos to Spain, with

a mere 22,000 remaining to the merchants as profit.

After

the trade reforms, in 1768, 150,000 pesos remained to the
merchants, and by 1769, 175,000 pesos.

In 1778, the corte

de caja (the government's share) in Guatemala jumped to
218,000 pesoa.9
Still, only thirty or thirty-five mercantile houses
controlled all the commerce in the Kingdom or Guatemala.
The Peru trade reopened, consisting of two or three ships
yearly bringing wine, olive oil, and table articles worth
200,000

to

300,000 pesos in exchange for indigo.

Cuba

averaged eight to ten vessels, exchanging rum and onions
worth 5,000 to 6,000 pesos per

shipment, for indigo and

3,000 to 4,000 pesos in gold and silver coin and bullion. 10
Mayorga wrote in 1773 of over 2 million gold pesos' worth
of indigo being exported yearlya
~jera,

Calera,
In

1787

the

the Ungo, Viteri, Laucel,

and Batres families controlled most of it.
fleet

took

to

Spain

5,677

arrobas

or

cochinilla, producing revenues of 283,750 in gold pesos.1 1
Troy Floyd has written an analysis of the merchant
class

of Guatemala and the

monopoly it ran within the

JOO

Kingdom. 12

There appears

to

peninsulares and criollos,
marriage,
advantage

compadrazgo,

have been a coalition of

an elite group interrelated by
and business ties,

their position at

0£

the

right

who

took

times.

The

textile revolution in Europe demanded indigo,

and the

Spanish merchant marine had been growing as the pirates
lost their control of the shipping lanes.
quarter of the 18th century,

Central America produced over

25 million pounds of indigo:
mined in Honduras,
pesos

yearly.

In the last

adding this to the silver

the income a.mounted to about 2 million

But many farmers complained against the

Consulado, the elite monopoly, insisting it stifled them by
dictating the prices of their crops.

As a result,

the

government passed laws attempting to "free" the "inner
provinces" (Nicaragua,

Honduras,

and El Salvador) from the

Guatemalan merchants.
The construction 0£ the fort at Omoa began this
movement of reform,
Hondurass

by symbolizing a freedom at least for

farmers theoretically did not have to ship their

indigo to Guatemala.

The fort's proximity to the Mota.gua.

River meant Salvadoran farmers could ship their wares on
that river to the new port.

Honduras again "benefitted"

with the opening of Trujillo to trade with Spain in 1782,
and Ni c a rag u a wi t h t h e R:! o S a. n J u an 1 n 1 7 9 6 •
reduced

all

taxes

in

1781,

Th e . Bou r b on s

specifically for

Omoa and

Trujillo, and in 1782, the alcabala (tax) for importation
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was lowered from four to two percent.

Two 7eare later the

council abolished the alcabala altogether. Hone of these
tax

reforms produced any significant change in commercial

patterns for one simple reasons
transportation.

the monopol7 owned all the

The farmers had no one to sell to but to

the Consulado in Guatemala.

Their only other option was to

buy ships and transport their own crops directly to Spain,
an option none or them could afford.
Two more laws were passed in an effort to help the
farmers.

Captain General Galvez ordered all trade from

Guatemala to go through Omoa,
Salvador through Zacapa to Omoa.
the same reason.

and the trade from

El

But these also failed for

To the merchant monopoly, even though

taxes dropped, the move to Omoa meant a net increase in
expenditures. The port of Santo Tonr!s proved to be the orux
of the problem1

because of pirate attacks,

collectorship there had been abandoned.
merchants shipped through Santo Tomis,

Thus,

the

tax

when the

they paid no taxes.

The lowering of tax percentages at Omoa and Trujillo only
placed them on the same level as Santo Tomas, and since the
transportation and

roads

to that port had been well

established and used for many years,
to use.

they remained cheaper

The elite had close ties with Cadiz, and saw no

reason to change their smooth-running .operation to other
cities in Spain,

either.
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Thus between 1789 and 1793, of twenty-four ships that
landed at Omoa and Santo Tonas,

twenty-one belonged to the

Cadiz merchants, and landed at the latter port.

That may

be why the members or the Consulado opposed building a fort
at Omoai
Let us say lastly, that one or the things that
slowed down the fortification of the coast of
the North Sea was the resistance put up by the
rich and priviledged merchants or the capital
of the Kingdom, with the interest of exerting a
more complete control, let us say monopoly,
over commerce, and to defend their contraband
with the same English, which so much profited
them.
Very clearly the king is told by the
Royal Officials of Comayagua, W·hen they
informed him by letter on December 3 or 1746
that the influential men of the city of
Guatemala were opposed to the fortification of
Trujillo, so that there should be only one
port, a dock, not a fort, to re~3ster the ships
of commerce on the Golfo Dulce.
The distinction between external and internal trade in
Guatemala also proved a purely artificial one.

The indigo

buyers controlled most other internal products alsos

they

would buy up cacao, cotton, threads, cloth, iron, cattle,
and hides, and trade in kind for the indigo crops.

By also

owning the banks, the Coneulado members provided most of
the currency for the regions

they yearly advanced about

one million pesos to the indigo farmers,

and purchased

about 50,000 head or cattle yearly for barter.

In short,

the consulado ran a true monopoly on all trade in the
Kingdom of Guatemala.14
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Britain ran a strong, if illegal, competition to the
Spanish

merchants.

Clarence

Haring

circumstances helped this illegal trade:

wrote

that

two

the length of the

coastlines Spain had to defend, and tolerance by Spanish
officials toward the contraband.
did

not

have

enough

surveillance.
regulations,

Central America simply

inhabitants

Because

of

this

to

afford

adequate

and the strict trade

even government officials participated in the

illegal trade,

often

olaiming--quite truthfully--that

colonists demanded and needed it. 1 5

the

The problem became so

extensive that the Audiencia began an intensive study in
1758

to

find

out

the

exact

extent

this

smuggling,

particularly in Honduras and the Moskitia. 1 6

This study

produced the report that indicted even
Omoa,

of

the

commandant of

Jose Antonio Palma.

But the Spanish merchants not only had to face British
competition:

they

labored

under

Spain's

mercantilist

theories that dictated which ports could or could not be
used, and what went through them.

Because at first Central

America had

all trade to and from

no port of entry,

Guatemala had to go through Veracruz in New Spain,
overland through Oaxaca.

and

In an attempt to overcome this,

the Consulado in Guatemala called a Cabildo abierto,

a town

council, and asked the President or the Audiencia to open
Omoa as a port of entry.

Doing so would reinstate the

protection of the Windward Navy,

under which they wanted to
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ship their indigo to Spain or to Havana.
acquiesced,

but Don Domingo de Nicheo,

five trading houses in Spain,
king, he claimed,
a result,

The president

a representative of

voiced opposition.

Only the

could take such a course of action.

As

the president sent an official request to the

king on the fifth of December,
the distances the

1758.

His

arguments noted

wares had to travel:

260 leagues to

Oa.:xaca, another 80 to Veracruz,

and only during February

and March did the weather permit the four-month trip to
Oaxaca . . From there
days.
of

to Veracruz took another

45 to 50

Thieves and bandits added to the cost and difficulty

the

trip,

as

did

accidents

caused

by

bad

road

conditions.
In all,

the president concluded,

reaching Veracruz in

time for the Register ship proved difficult, and storage
was very expensive if the wares did not arrive on time.
contra.et,

the trip to Bodegas covered only 80 leagues,

By
and

from there to Omoa was another 120 leaguesz

a new road had

been opened at a

facilitating

cost

of

16,089 pesos,

communication with the new port.

If the king approved the

trade with Havana, a 150 ton ship would suffice to carry
all the trade at first,

and would be very beneficial to

trade and commerce for the whole kingdom of Guatemala.

It

would increase the diversification and volume of trade, and
thus the revenues to the king's ooffera.17
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The request took three years to procesez

on the 5th or

January, 1761, the Council announced an order, originally
written on March 5,

1760, approving free commerce between

Omoa and Spain, through Havana. 18

Eut though approved, the

new route took some time to develop.

Three years later,

the cacao export had almost disappeared,

though indigo and

xiquilite (superior unprocessed indigo} had increased some.
Commerce with New Spain increased dramaticallyz
as a result

or this

the king issued a Royal

possibly
Edict

on

January 17, 1764, lifting the ban on trade with Peru and
New Granada.

A dramatic increase in trade did not mean

much, though.

The port or Omoa in 1764 saw only two major

export shipmentss

the taranta Jesus,

Joe~

y Mar{a under
4

Jose Retortillo arrived from O:Cdiz and returned with gold,
silver, and other products,

and El Vigilante under Captain

Cosme Joaquin Therreros took the same type or load.

Royal

ships still stopped at Omoa regularly, supplying the fort
and workers with materials and roodsturrs.19
From then until 1775 ship movement at Omoa gradually
increased. · After 1775 it almost stopped,
ot the war in the Caribbean.

possibly because

Rubio sanohez believes the

use of the port seemed low because of the lack 0£ knowledge
concerning it. Commerce increased slowly with time, as
knowledge 0£ the port spread.20
The king finally
protected trade

decided in 1765 that only free

could revive

the

sagging agricultural
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economies in the colonies.

A Royal Edict on October 16 of

that year opened several new ports or entry in Spain.

The

results proved positive, and the trend spread, opening more
ports in the colonies.

Omoa prospered as welli

by

177~

it

had need or a group of port pilots, headed by Jose Antonio
Martinez.

Commerce

diversified

also,

as

the

captain-

generals in the mid-1700's had encouraged production or new
grains with moderate success, and the production of tobacco
spread to Istepec, Chinameca, Copan, and Le6n, Nicaragua.
The Audiencia commissioned another road to San Pedro Sula
in 1780, which Juan Pinto and Francisco Fortani signed a
contract to build. 21

Chapter Ninei

Construction at

Cost and Value

Omoa

officially

ended

in

1775.

King's minister Zemn de Somodevilla's military policies of
aggressive belligerence against

the British in Belize had

taken their toll on the speed or construction by diverting
funds,

dividing the

military strength,

accomplishing much of anything.
finally ground to a halt,

and not really

The sluggish movement

exhausted economically by

Somodevilla's efforts to do too much at one time.
British forces had great admiration for
without seeming overly concerned with it.

the fort,

They considered

its location an · excellent harbor, and "the fortress at Omoa
should

have

always

the

been exceedingly strong,
consequence

of

labour

if strength were
and

expense." 1

A

description written in the Annual Register mentions walls
28 feet high surrounded by a deep dry ditch,
18 feet thick1

with parapets

the entire structure had been made of solid

stone raised, the authors claimed, from the sea 20 leagues
away.

"Its batteries shewed about 40 pieces of artillery;

but it seemed to have been deficient in that respect, as
well as in point of garrison."2
So perhaps Salvatierra is correct in assumming that
although Omoa did not serve much of an active role in the
defense of the Kingdom of Guatemala, it had somewhat of a
107
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deterrent effect, by letting the British know that Spain
intended to make good its claim to the north coast of
Central America.
This fort and that of La Inmaculada of the
river San Juan came to be the formidable
obstacles where was wrecked, conquered, the
English pretention to take over the now called
Central American Isthmua.3
Omoa

may not have been

as strong a deterrent as

Salvatierra opines, but the possibility exists that the
Spaniards knew of Oliver Cromwell's great plans for the
area. The Spaniards then made their presence known just
enough to foil these plans, or to intimidate Cromwell's
counsellors into believing that the Western Design would
not be the easy pushover Cromwell thought.

The same could

be said to have happened to later English monarchs.
The cost of the fort had been staggering to the
Spanish Crown.

At

t he end

of

17 6 1 ,

Fe r nan d e z

gave a

detailed account of the expenses incurred to June 22 of
that years
from

875,147 pesos, 6 reales, not counting the loans

Campeche,

Comayagua,

Havana,

Chiquimula, and Zacapa.

Guatemala had also used up the credit of 40,964 pesos, 5
r ea l e s ,

and 7 mar av e d{ a 1 o an e d t o Ca mp e ch e t o a up po r t

Melchor de Navarrete on an expedition against the British
in Valis (Belize).4

The town of Sonsonate sent an expense

report fora
February 6, 1760---130 pesos for salary and trip
April 15, 1761-----192 pesos for rice

J J0

60 pesos for its transport to Saoapa
80 pesos from Sacapa to Golfo
November 22, 1763--325 pesos for 32 quintales,
one arroba, 19 pounds of Ja.rcia. de
Xenique
May 4, 1766--------200 pesos for rice
____5_4___
p_e_s_o_s for its transportation
total 1,043 pesos.
Thi s bi 11 was s i g n e d by And re s Gu e r r a in June ,

17 6 8 •5

Francisco Xavier de Requena signed a report of accounts
rendered by the Royal ·Coffers to the fortification project
for salaries, mail, recruitment, and recruits, for the
dates January 28, 1752, through May, 1768:
1752---------------66,-61. 6. 22 2/3
1753-~-------------51,235. 6. 17
1754--------------158,540. o. 11 (includes 29,871. 2 1/2
'
spent on a Balis t:Belize J expedition)
1755---------------55,222. 2. 17
1756---------------95,463. 6. 17
1757---------------95,162. 6. 17
1758---------------63,484. 5. 0
1759--------------148,552. 6. 0
1760---------------73,004. 7. 0
1761---------------75,370. 2. 1
1762---------------51,131. 4. 6 1/2
1763---------------34,531. 4. 22 1/2
1764---------------56,541. 5. 0
1765---------------55,534. 6. 0
1766---------------38,160. 7. 5 2/3
1767---------------56,163. 5. 0
1768---------------34,089. 2. 0 (Jangary to May 21)
total
1,199,282. 3. 1 1/3
Comayagua submitted a separate cost sheet, for the period
between June 2, 1752 and July 25, 1768, signed by Manuel
Lopes de Rajo y Soto:
1752---------------50,000.
1753-~--~---------------o.

1755----------------1,641.
1756----------------9,082.
1756 (sic.J---------3,311.
1759 tsic ·J---------5, 524.

o
o
0
0
4
0

(April

1~)

ll l

1759----------------5,052.
1760----------------5,434.
1761-----------------,855.
1762----------------1,903.
1763------------------330.

6
4

6
4
0

o

1764-7--~-~-----------~-o.

1768------------------214. 0 CJuly 25)
total
83,349. 0 7
Calder6n Quijano provides

a

different

set of figures,

signed by Armiz y Madas
Note on the quantities that have been spent from
the Royal Coffers in our charge, for the
assistance of the port of San Fernando de Omoa,
since the 27th of January of 1752, when the
expenses began, until the 20th of July of 1773.
On the salaries of officials,
employees, and recruits----------- 39,515.
on money remitted-----------------995,806.
on food and transportation fees---435,718.
on purchase of negros------------- 55,760.
on various equipment,
and transportation fees-----------121,360.
on various minor expenses------4,632.

5. 1/2

s.

0
3. 1/2
O. 0

5. 0
4. 1/2

total----------1,~52,763. 7.

Though construction
of the war,

1/2 8

had been stopped in 1764 because

the garrison had remained to protect the site.

An expense breakdown for that year shows the cost in pesos
of supporting the garrisons
January---------2,102.
February--------1,993.
March-----------2,078.
April-----------1,868.
May-------------1,580.
June------------1,668.
July------------1,762.
August----------1,752.
September-------1,680.
October---------1,846.
November--------1,718.
December--------1,753.

1
1

7
4
4

7
2
2
5. 1 /2
6. 1/2. 1 I Ji
i•9112. 1/4

J)2

Salazar reported that by 1766;
rule,

at the beginning of his

1,117,690 pesos and 7 reales had been spent,

the foundations could be seen.
spent

another

129, 331

pesos

Clearing

and only

By July, 1766, Murga had

putting

the

up

swamps

the

walls

raised

the

and
cost

several

arches.

also. 1 0

A typical construction monthly expense sheet might

look like this one signed by Joseph Pussilla:
August 1767
Infantry and artillery------------480.
Volunteers------------------------306.
Civilian workers------------------127.
Monthly salaries officers -------129.
Plaza Mayor materials -----------250.
total
7,288.

1.2
6
6
6

6. 11/13

6.

2/3

11

Salazar, in an effort to cut the cost of reeding the
workers,

gave orders to restock,

Royal Hacienda at Cuyamel,

at royal expense,

the

by then confiscated from Palma.

He required the corregimientos of Comayagua and Chiquimula
to help supply food.

He also sent a request to the king

that all supply ships arriving at the fort be exempt from
taxes for a period or ten years, in the hope or attracting
more merchants.
period.

The king agreed,

but only for a five-year

The Cuyamel project the king vetoed, and asked

Salazar to

enact

measures

insuring prompt pay for

the

militias at the fort.12
Business did pick up somewhat during the construction
period.

Merchants not

connected with the fort paid 10,438

pesos in taxes in 1766, on 2,609 1/2 zurronea of dye loaded

] ]3

onto the ships Jesds Mar!a l

Josep~

and Santa B!rbara,

under Captains Pedro Barcelo and Joseph de Urristti. 1 3
B7 1777 the

cost of the construction had gone down

drastically, as had, of course, the amount of work being
done.

That year a bill submitted by Dona Caeilda Araoa for

the work of land fills requested payment fora
May--------1036 loada-------------777 pesos
June-------1044 loads-------------783 pesos
July------- 938 loads-------------703 pesos
August-------8~3~2,,__l_o_a_d_s__
-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-~-~---_-_6~2_4,,_.;-p
__
e_s_o_s
total
3,850 loads
D
887 pesos 1 4
An estimate of the cost

to

finish

the

project

came

to

179,240.4.8 pesosz
To
To
To
To
To

unload and fix the shops---------9,639 pesos
reload and finish the shops------1,408
finish the parapets, and stairs-82. 2
finish the counterscape----------3,112
resurface the parapets and
covered road-------4,024
Excavation to fix the stores--------1,344
To finish the bulwarks--------------1,596
To refill the parapets--------------1,870. 2. 17
landfille--------------------------98,035. 1. 05
total
179,240. 4. 08 15
In

yearly.

1806

the

price

of

labor

exceeded

19,000

pesos

As this labor meant black slaves, the government

felt something had to be done to cut the cost. Most slaves
did

not

work

at

the

f ort--they filled

in

as

personal

servants to the military officers, whose political power
had grown too strong to be bucked.

The solution to the

problem came in 1811

with the emancipation of the slaves,

though these

remain

had

to

on

their

allotted

lands. 1 6

] ]4

Batres Jauregui puts the cost of maintenance for the fort
after the construction at 60,000 pesos yearly. 17
During the construction period, the secretary of the
Indies, Arriaga, recognized that the fort might have been a
white elephant after all.

It had taken over sixteen years

to build, earning a reputation as a graveyard for bodies
and money,

and yet its purpose as a defensive fort came to

be questioned seriously:
This port, elected as the most useful to the
commerce of that Kingdom and having begun to
establish and fortify 16 years ago, has been a
sepulcher of peoples, and much more of. monies.
It has been the successive special charge given
to Presedents Vasquez Prego, Moreno and
Heredia, but the work has advanced little. Its
fortification cannot count with more than
receiving the respect of corsairs and one or
two other ships which might attempt to insult
it;
but when exposed to being beaten by an
enemy squadron, it could be of very little use
except as far as has been mentioned1 but in
any case, as a more adaptable and safe port for
the commerce of the province, and the only one
which should remain, it is best that you do
your utmost t°a see to the conclusion of the
project begun. 1
General opinion held that the fort could not withstand
a serious attack by an enemy because it was too small.

Its

only value could be for commerce, because of the good bay:
the fort provided a sense of security that merchants liked.
Arriaga thus held the opinion that as passive defense the
fort

became useless.

Either he did not know

or he

overlooked the original intention of the project as a base
for an aggressive defense of the coast.

Spain could no

) 15

longer arrord to outfit the large numbers of ships required
to implement n!ez' system, or even to stock large defensive
forts.

So Arriaga used the poor planning as an excuse to

justify the apparent failure to build an adequate fort at
Omoas

perhaps, he surmised, some use could be salvaged by

using it to defend a small commercial port.
ten

years

Arriaga's

between
letter,

the
the

beginning
purpose

of

of the

In the short

construction
tort

had

and

changed

completely from the aggressive warfare school of thought to
the passive defense theory.
Architecturally and technically speaking,
remains hard to categorize.

the fort

Zapatero notes that its design

by Aranda anticipated by twenty years the development of
the triangle style of fort by Montalembert,

for it was

simultaneous with the teachings or the school at
which influenced all
Germany and Sweden.

military design in Italy,

~zieres,

Spain,

But he points out that three of the

leading military architects disapproved of a triangle as
the basic plan for a fort.

Crist6bal Rojas, professor at

the Escuela Militar de Fortiticacion Ofensiva y De£ensiva,
arte de Fuegos y de Esouadronar,

wrote that the triangle

plan should only be used as a last resort1

J. Cassani of

the same institution said the same thing in 17041
Pedro

de

Luouze,

director

Matemticas in Barcelona,

of

the

wrote in 1772

Real

Academia

and
de

that a triangular

I I6

fort could withstand a siege just as long as any other, and
for a much lower cost, though he preferred other styles. 1 9
Zapatero does give an attempt to classify Omoa, by its
different attributesz
The fort, according to the norms or the art or
fortification, is the followings Defensive, by
its disposition from few to many1 composite,
by being composed of natural and artificial;
irregular, by the disproportion or the capital
radius or bulwarks 1 and 3; comfortable, by
its conditions and mediums1 advantageous, by
dominating the field; useful or of consequence
by being the key to the defense and
communication to the Valley of Sula and the
Royal Road to Guatemala;
horizontal, because
all the rooms are on the same level;
by its
domination, large; and remote, by the number or
o an n on a n d r e a c h o f o v e r 1 , JJ 0 0 v a r a s o f
Castille. 2 O
Zamora notes that San Fernando

did not

have the

appearance of a feudal castle nor the conditions
modern fort.

The bulwark

of a

system predominated in the

1700'e, having been introduced during the time of the Duke
of Alva, from Italy, where Paociotti, the father of modern
fortification,

had adopted it. 21

On the sixth of September,

1771,

President of the

Audiencia Bernardo Troncoso del Rinc6n ordered engineer
Antonio Porta y Costas to make a survey and report of
conditions at Omoa.

The latter submitted the required

report on April 30, 1792. 22
The fort's position was 15 degrees,

4 minutes 9

seconds North, and 287 degrees, 14 minutes longitude from
the Tenerife Meridian, with an elevation of no more than

I 17

two feet above sea level.

The hot, humid weather became

unhealthy when the sea breezes blew over the swamps in the
winter.

The bay itsel.r seemed good,

protected completely

on the first and second quadrants, and part of the thirdz
its bottom was loam, with white sandy beaches. An effort
should be made to check the slow and continuous silting up
effect

o.r

around

the Omoa

it

and

River

dropping

by planting
rocks

a.t

trees

the

and

river's

shrubs
mouth.

Landmarks near the fort included Puerto Caballos, three
leagues eastward;

the Chameleoon River with a

six feet, seven leagues eastward;
draught of seven feet,
San

Pedro

could

draught

of

the Ulua River, with a

nine leagues eastward.

Sula remained very dangerous,

The road to

as

travellers

easily be ambushed by the British at the Chameleoon

crossing.
The

structure

of

the

fort

followed

that

"Hornaveque Doble" or crown, with thirty-one
barracks, stores,

magazines, chapel and dungeons.

had a counterecape,
having only an
plaster).

of

a

rooms for
The moat

but the walls lacked all the parapets,

exterior "revestimiento"

(coating of

Some 0£ the curtains had been finished already.

The circular part needed stairs, and all the landfills,
including that of the covered road, remained incomplete.
The arms

plaza,

finished,

either.

parapets,

and esplanades

had

not

been

A hill 800 varas away, 32 1/2 varas high
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and 280 in circumference dominated the forti

the town on

the lee side of the hill had been built away from the only
healthy breezes available.
the

river,

the

entire

Despite the silting action of
bay

still

remained

deep,

a

characteristic of the entire Caribbean between the Ulua and
Motagua ri vere.
In

critiquing

the

structure,

Porta

noted

the

undefended appearance of the two wings and all the 6olas
and circulars.

They had no flanking points, a defect that

facilitated an enemy scaling assault.

The redoubt of El

Real had fallen into disrepair and did not have sufficient
strength to defend itself.

Because of this,

it also could

be used as a cover by an attacking force, thus forming a
serious defect in the defensive system.
the

fort

appeared

strong,

but

the

The outer walls of
interior

needed

improvement because of the lack or adequate drainages

rain

seeped from the ramparts into the stores and barracks,
melting the lime mortar.

For this reason Porta expressed

doubts that the interior walls could last more than a
couple of years, and hoped they could be rebuilt.

Another

major problem with the drainage also concerned the stores,
for they were built

one foot lower than the plaza. floor,

and subsequently flooded with frightening regularity.
In its present condition, Porta concluded, the fort
could not be defended, and the long-term projects to repair
it should be started as soon as possible.

The

seaside
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bulwarks needed to be enlarged or added to, as mentioned
earlier.

The road to San Pedro Sula seemed to have been

the only operating one,

and Porta recommended i t be

abandoned in favor of the

unfinished road started in 1778.

The new one proved susceptible to attack, as shown by the
British in 1781.
and

repairs

another

His estimate to complete the construction

came

63,791

to

179,2110

pesos

to

pesos

build

and

two

4 realea,

half

plus

bulwarks

to

complement and enhance the defensive posture of the site. 2 3
Porta gave one final recommendation:
port of Santo Torma a

he found the

much more suitable port of entry, if

a canal could be built to the Motagua River.
freight

could

be

unloaded

from

the

ships

This done,
and

onto

riverboats which could then travel upstream to San Pedro
Sula, eliminating some of the danger posed by bandits and
pirates on the Omoa route.

Porta therefore stated that the

fort

abandoned

at

Omoa

should

be

transferred to Santo Tomas.

and

the

garrison

The cost might be heavy to

begin with, but the long-range savings would be very much
worth the trouble.

Omoa, he pointed out, could not and did

not stop banditry along the Che.meleoon or Ulua rivers.

He

also pointed out that a more thorough survey of the area
should be taken before following up on his report.24
Thie

report

seems

typical of the attitude

many

Spaniards held concerning the defense of the Caribbean:
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forts should be built with land protection in mind.

But

Omoa's use as a fort against land expeditions only came
about

because

of

the

indecisive

policies

of

the

administrators in the government of Guatemala and Spain.
Constant

bickering between the

concerning
system,
court

colonial

defense

two

hurt

schools

the

of

thought

strength

of

the

as did the conflicts of ambitions, ideologies,

and

factions. 2 5
The result of all this bickering was predictable--a

poorly constructed San Fernando de Omoa.
excellent,

Its plane, though

had been poorly executedz

The Fort at San Fernando is of terrible
construction for the elementary reason that it
was condemned, by its basic concept, to be so.
With heroic stubborness, the Spanish builders
took upon themselves to follow a structure of
heavy and elephantine ideology and execution,
against all tnconveniences and insolvable
limitations. 2
Telles contends in his technical assessment of the
fort that Spain's technology at the time did not have the
ability to create a floor elastic enough to not break under .
the strain of the climatic and temperature changes, and yet
strong enough to hold up the amount of fill-in required by
the plans.

Spain,

ability

do

to

so.

in essence,
They

built a

could

not

fort beyond its

make

the

fill-in

waterproof enough, so the high humidity and rainfall of the
area made the wails crack under both the enormous weight
and the erosive action of the water.

The engineers used

12 J

brick made locally o! inferior clay with a high organic
matter content.

The salt and minerals in the clay

dissolved when it rained, causing the brick to decompose
£aster than the lime mortar used to bold them together.
The !ill-in areas, because of the absorbing characteristics
of the dirt and sand used, became basically a large water
tank,

which dripped and poured water through cracks almost

constantly.

The humidity in the stores made their use

almost impossible.27
The economic maintenance of Spanish forts was the
responsibility of the local
agricultural and manufactured
Comayagua,

authorities.

A

tax

on

commerce had to be paid in

which would then be sent on to Omoa and

A proposal called on the Audiencia to route all

Trujillo.

ores from the mines in Honduras through the two fortified
ports.

If enacted,

this traffic could then be taxed to

maintain both the forts and the roads used by the ore
ca.rts. 28
The port and fort of Omoa created an unusual political
situation.

As a military plaza, it came under the direct

supervision of the Captain-general--but it also had its own
political government,
customs-houses,

municipal and other officers,

royal treasury,

consulado in Guatemala.

and a delegate to the

The Captain-general had more than

just military and customs jurisdiction over Omoa, when
compared to other forts in Central America, because of its

122

port or entry status.
0£ Chiquimula,
Comayagua.

Omoa bordered on the Corregimiento

and therefore £ell under the government 0£

But Comayagua only held

jurisdiotion over

matters conoerning the taxation of merchandioe to and £rom
Honduras,

because Omoa. controlled its own commerce,

the main port 0£ entry £or

being

Guatemala City.

As far as the line 0£ authority went, the Captaingeneral of the kingdom had £inal say over military matters.
He held the responsibility for all armed £oroes on land and
sea.,

named all the military assistants in the government,

and appointed all other military ministers (quartermasters,
treasurers, eto.). 2 9

All the kingdom's forts fell under

his direct supervision as pa.rt of the defense of the areas
Omoa, San Juan de Ulda, Trujillo, Gol£o Dulce, Hatina, etc.
When the Audiencia separated the jurisdiction 0£ the ports
from the torts, the latter remained in the same line of
a.uthorityz

thus the town or Omoa became the concern or

Comayagua, but the fort remained under the command of the
Captain-general, while the port or commerce held its own
authority,

under the Audiencia..30

Chapter Tena

In

May,

1779,

Loss and Recovery

Captain-general

Matias

de

Galvez

appointed Sim6n de Desnaux, a rorty-year-old LieutenantColonel of Engineers, as military commander of Omoa. Galvez
expressed a serious concern ror the fort's safety because
of the recent outbreak or hostilities with England.
recognized

the

serious

tactical

construction of the fort,

errors

made

and feared an attack,

in

He
the

if only

because of the closeness of the Balis (Belize) enemy camps.
He

visited Omoa,

September.

leaving Guatemala on

On the

sixth

of

the

seventh

of

August Galvez noted the

completion of the new road between the capital and Omoa,
and the clearing of the mangroves and swamps enough to
render the place livable.

As a result, he recommended the

official court mail route be through Omoa,

rather than

through Veracruz. 1
The following September 21st,
command at Omoa,

Desnaux took up his

and recognized immediately the intent of

the British to take the fort by foroe.2
he reported

having

recognized four

horizon at ten in the morning.

Three days later

enemy

ships

on

the

Knowing the poor state of

the fort's defense provisions, he put one small cannon on
board

a

Spanish

ship

in

the

harbor

and

requested

available gunpowder be sent to the fort immediately.
123
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enemy ships entered the harbor flying Spanish flags--a
popular pirate trick--but Desna.ux fired at them.
British returned fire,
slightlya

The

damaging the walls of the fort

at sunset the British

raised their proper

colors.

Apparently landing

midnight,

the pirates attempted to do some bartering with

Spanish merchants for dyes.

just outside the bay at

They then put out to sea on

the morning of the 26th, leaving behind one frigate damaged
in the fra.ca.s.3
Desnaux

immediately

sent

reinforcements and war materiel,

Galvez

a

request

for

as his current stock had

dropped to dangerously low levels.

He needed money also:

because of backpay problems, Desnaux felt little confidence
in his men, who showed little interest in doing their jobs.
A company of Spaniards,

100 to 600 men strong, had

earlier pressed an attack on the settlement at St. George's
Cay, in an attempt to send the ba.ymen there packing.

The

Governor · of Jamaica answered by sending Captain Dalrymple,
the

commander of a new force

George's relief.
squadrons

of Irish troops,

to St.

Admiral Sir Peter Parker also sent a

the frigates Charon, Lowestaffe 1 and the Pomona,

a.long with the schooner Race Horse, all under the command
of Captain Luttrell.
possible,

They had orders to intercept,

several Register ships in the area.4

similar types of hostilities ca.used
more:

i£

This and

war to break out once

the hostile conduct of the English despite the
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treaty of 1763, united to other causes,

made Spain declare

war again on England.5
Luttrell and Dalrymple joined forces for the second
attack on Omoa the following Octobers

on the sixteenth,

Desnaux sighted more enemy sails on the horizon.

Twelve

vessels in all showed up--two frigates, a ship, a paquebot,
a brigantine, two other armed boats, and five vessels not
described.

The guns of the fort disabled one ship and ran

another aground,

whereupon

the

attack temporarily ceased.

Desnaux issued an order threatening to execute anyone who
did not

show up for general quarters.

Forty-five thousand

pesos in the cashier's box he removed to safety, probably
into the fort, but possibly he sent them to San Pedro Sula,
to remove them from danger altogether.
day,

On the following

the seventeenth, the British landed at Puerto Caballos

and marched across to Omoa.
According to the Annual Register,

1780, the British

forces numbered about five hundred, under the leadership of
naval captains Parkenham, Nugent, and Parker, and Captain
Carden of the 60th of Engineers.6 After a small skirmish
with a group of negros, they took the hill near the town.
Zamora claims Desnaux and his lieutenants Juan nastier and
Juan Ant on i o Mart! n e z did not keep an ad e qua t e wat oh , and
neither did the rest of the 230 men in the fort.7
Rodr!guez expresses the same opinion.a

Joa~
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Desnaux ordered artillery fire,

but the cannon mounts

still had not been completed, so the cannon could not be
aimed very accurately.

He moved several cannon from the

Spanish ships in the harbor to the fort, for the lack of a
decent number or artillery there.

Then another problem

arose--not enough men had the training to work the cannon.
The British ships returned into the bay, exchanging several
shots with the fort.

Desnaux mentions

bravery or several artillery officers:
Toll,

and

British

Tom~.

attack seriously.

and

zambos

~rrandiz,

nastier,

After setting fire

footsoldiers

the outstanding

to

began

the

town,

pressing

the
their

Because the torroon recommended by Murga

and nrez had not been built, Luttrell found it easy to trap
the Spanish ships in the harbor.
trained

soldiers

gunpowder left.

in the fort

By evening,

had only

the ill-

300 kegs

of old

They could only wait for defeat

or

reinforcements from Guatemala.
The next day, the eighteenth, Desnaux moved several
small cannon to the rear walls, but could only afford to
fire one shot every quarter of an hour.
Daatier went on a reconnaisance patrol,
the

counterscape,

unfinished

and

Commander Juan

and reported that

without

a

landfill,

provided an excellent shelter for the British, becoming a
hindrance to the · defense.
Clerec and

Men~ndez

tried

On the nineteenth,
twice to

remove

the

officers
British
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infantrymen,

but failed because they lacked proper cannon

coverage.
Desnaux reported that on the 20th he had to force all
the black artillerymen out or the barracks to man their
cannon.

That day the British forces began their assault on

the south bulwark, then moved to the north side, where they
forced

the

Puerta

del

Socorro

and

scaled

the

walla.9

Another account holds that on the 19th, the Spaniards ran
out of powder,

whereupon Bene Huelhe with 1,000 men scaled

the counterscape on the west wall, built two varas lower
than the parapets.
walls with,

They entered the moat and scaled the

according to Mencos Fajardo,

the fort but carelessly left outside.

ladders owned by

Rubio S!nchez quotes

Desnaux' report that approximately 2,500 invaders

took the

entire garrison captive.10
Zamora puts the time or the attack at 4:30 a.m., and
mentions no resistance by the Spaniards other than one
cannon

fired

Portuguese

by

officer

mercenary.

Men~ndez

which

killed

one

Under-Lieutenant Clerac prevented

Sergeant Thome from firing two cannon with shot at the
British after they entered the £ort.11
presents a different story:
that morning,

The Annual Register

after a cannonade since three

150 men with ladders approached the fort

without being seen till they crossed the ditch.
ladders broke under the cannonfire,

Several

but eventually two

seamen mounted the walls and held the Spanish defenders,
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Map showing troop and ship positions during the battle. Copy of
an original by Joseph Antonio Martfnez, sent to the Council by
Joseph Gregorio Rivera in February of 1780. AGI Sevilla, sign.
Mapas y Planas, Guatemala 241, in Zapatero, p. 189.
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overoome by surprise, at gunpoint until the rest of the
invaders olimbed up.

The Spanish fled over the walls,

and

hid in the casementa.12
Bancroft tells the story in yet another way, stating
that
a better rate might have attended them
the
t.spaniardsJ
had not
some
of the negro
artillerymen and a company of regulars,
dismayed by the odds against them,
turned
recreant and broken down with their axes the
gates of the fortress. 1 3
The

number

or

captives

Mancos

souroei

taken

reports

including Desnaux,

400

varies

acoording

prisoners

and

to

100

the
men,

The Annual Register lists 355

escaping.

rank and file, plus officers and townspeople taken. 1 4

At

the official surrender, the Governor and prinoipal officers
handed

over

their

captors the fort,
had

earlier

swords

and

keys,

yielding

to

their

the garrison, and the Register ships that

eluded

Admiral

Parker's

orders

for

their

capture.
After

some negotiations,

the captives

marched out

free, in return for the release of several British men from
Cayo

Cocia.n.

The

Church plate and ornaments

from

the

chapel Huelhe held as deposit, to ensure compliance with
his

commands.

The

British

took

merchandise

from

the

Register ships valued at over three million, either pesos
or pieoes-of-eight.

Garo!a

Pel~ez

says Desnaux left his

second in command and two chaplains as hostagea. 1 5

Desnaux

130

did offer a ransom £or the 250 quintales or quicksilver;
but Huelhe declined the offer, as the loss of the mercury
could hinder Guatemala much more than the ransom might help
the British.

A similar offer of ransom for the fort he

also turned down, leaving a small garrison to guard it.
There is some debate concerning the retaking of the
fort by Spanish forces.

Domingo Juarros and Andres Calvo

state that the British garrison had evacuated Omoa by the
time Matias de Galvez arrived there to lay aiege. 1 6 But
Garcia Pelaez, Bancroft, and Modesto Lafuente wrote of a
vicious fight for the reconquest. 1 7
Ro b e r t o Riv as ,
repulsed a British

t he go v e r no r

h ad

contingent from his province,

hearing of the disaster at Omoa,
account varies, but

of Yu ca tan ,

headed that way.

j

us t
and,
The

apparently he arrived too late, though

his ships managed to chase down the Leviathan, which had
foundered with all the money taken at Omoa. 1 8
records the story otherwise:

Bancroft

the ship with the treasure

foundered and sank in a storm, and the rest of the British
ships barely managed to escape.

Apparently the ship Rivas

captured had on board some Spanish prisoners or war, which
Huelhe had sent away from the scene so
hindrance to him or a help to his

they could not be a

foes. 19

When Matiaz de Galvez heard of the fall of Omoa, he
raised an army,

forced loans from

the merchants of

J3 I

Guatemala,

and sent out requests for aid and support.

The

Viceroy in New Spain sent 500,000 pesos and troops through
Galvez' itinerary took him through Chiquimula,

Oaxaca.

Joa~,

Copan, and San
Comayagua

sent

a

where he waited £or several

contingent

under

Anzoategui,

an army under Colonel Manuel

Salvador sent

arrived

at

Quesaila

on

days.

and

San

Francisco

Panigo.

Galvez

the

31st

or

October.

The Comayagua troops had arrived early--on the

23rd--and encountered many black slaves and escapees from
Galvez armed 99

Omoa.

or these with machetes and lances,

and waited for the 238 reinforcements from Guatemala.
the 9th of November he received 150 rifles,
bullets,

3 trabucos (blunderbusses),

~6

On

quintales of

106 pairs of pistols,

55 shotguns, and a large quantity of powder and flints. 20
By November 18, Galvez had arrived at San Pedro Sula.
Pardons

were

given

to

prisoners

in

San

Salvador,

San

Vicente, San Miguel, and Sonsonate, on the condition that
they

join his

army.

Zamora

claims Galvez

warned

the

Viceroy or New Spain, who sent Roberto Rivas with an army
from Yucatan. The latter arrived too late for any action
other than to capture the shipload of prisoners Bene Huelhe
had sent to Lake Izabal.

Huelhe had done this so Galvez

could not count on them to help in the force to retake the
fort. 21
On the 23rd or November, Galvez and his army left San
Pedro Sula.

After camping at Choloma, they arrived the
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next

day

at

Rancho

Fernando de Omoa.
the fort

and

Ojo

de

Agua,

On the 25th,

the river,

restocking or retreating.

two leagues

San

he took the heights around

to prevent the British from
A report or

the Spanish army

states they had 230 rifles, 2 quintals of
quintales or bullets,

from

powder, and

3

to be spread among the following

troops1
troops
50

Batall6n de Infanter!a
Squadron or Dragoons
militias
prisoners or "exiles"
blacks, slaves
totals
A group
beachfront.
of

of blacks

officers
ii

91

8

296

22

80
60

311 22

577
went

to

def end

the

river

and

The prisoners dug trenohes to within 100 paces

the British front

lines.

Twelve grenadiers

Batal16n de Infanter!a and five cadets 2 3

of

the

provided cover

for the laborers, the latter holding up under tremendous
return fire from the British lines.

The blacks

by the

river caught some British sailors and beheaded two of them,
though four managed to escape into the fort.
On the morning of the 26th, Galvez sent a soldier with
letters to Bene Huelhe, offering terms for surrrendering.
Huelhe refused to accept them,
consider

a

prisoner

but wrote that he would

exchange.

Later

in

the

day

a

brigantine anchored and fired artillery at the Spanish
forces.

The latter put up a great show, playing band music
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Guatemala,

and sent out requests for aid and support.

The

Viceroy in New Spain sent 500,000 pesos and troops through
Oaxaca.

Galvez' itinerary took him through Chiquimula,

Copan, and San Jose,
Co may a g u a

a en t

where he waited several for days.

a contingent

under

An z oat e g u i ,

Francisco

Salvador sent an army under Colonel Manuel
arrived at

and San

Pan i go.

Galvez

Quesaila on the

31st of

October.

The Comayagua troops had arrived early--on the

23rd--and encountered many black slaves and escapees from
Galvez armed 99

Omo a.

of these with machetes and lances,

and waited for the 238 reinforcements from Guatemala.

On

the 9th of November he received 150 rifles, 46 quintales of
bullets,

3 trabucos (blunderbusses),

106 pairs of pistols,

55 shotguns, and a large quantity of powder and flints. 20
By No v e mbe r 1 8 , Ga 1 v e z had a r r i v e d at San Pe d r o Su 1 a.
Pardons

were given to

prisoners

in San

Salvador,

San

Vicente, San Miguel, and Sonsonate, on the condition that
they

join his army.

Zamora

claims Galvez warned the

Viceroy of New Spain, who sent Roberto Rivas with an army
from Yucatan. The latter arrived too late for any action
other than to capture the shipload of
had sent to lake Izabal.

prisoner~

Bene Huelhe

Huelhe had done this so Galvez

could not count on them to help in the force to retake the
fort.2 1
0 n t he 2 3 rd o £ No v e mbe r , Ga 1 v e z and hi s a r my 1 e f t San
Pedro Sula.

After camping at Choloma, they arrived the

132

next

day at

Rancho Ojo de Agua,

Fernando de Omoa.
the fort

two leagues from San

On the 25th, he took the heights around

and the river,

restocking or retreating.

to prevent the British from
A report of

the Spanish army

states they had 230 rifles, 2 quintals of
quintales of bullets,

powder, and 3

to be spread among the following

troopsz
Bata116n de Infanteria
Squadron of Dragoons
militias
prisoners or "exiles"
blacks, slaves
totals

troops
50
91
296

officers
4

8

22

80

60

34 22

~

577

A group of blacks went to def end
beachfront.

the river and

The prisoners dug trenches to within 100 paces

of the British front lines.

Twelve grenadiers

Batall6n de Infanter1a and five cadeta23

of the

provided cover

for the laborers, the latter holding up under tremendous
return fire from the British lines.

The blacks

by the

river caught some British sailors and beheaded two of them,
though four managed to escape into the fort.
On the morning of the 26th, Galvez sent a soldier with
letters to Bene Huelhe, offering terms for surrrendering.
Huelhe refused to accept them,
consider

a

prisoner

but wrote that he would

exchange.

Later

in

the

day

a

brigantine anchored, and fired artillery at the Spanish
forces.

The latter put up a great show, playing band music
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in several places and lighting many bonfires, in an effort
to fool the British into thinking they had more forces than
The following morning Galvez sent a prisoner to

they did.

request surrender again.

He offered to punish the slaves

who had killed the two British men by the river.

Huelhe

exchanged the prisoner for one of his, sending back another
refusal. 2 4
On the 28th, the British forces fired all they had at
the Spanish in the trenches,

the river

mouth,

and the

Six blacks attempted a sortie to obtain

cattle yards.

food, but had to leave the two cows they killed outside.
Boats came and went by the fort all day:

by nightfall

Ga l v e z be c am e s u s pi c i o u s , and o rd e r e d a pat r o 1 t o spy o u t
the fort. A company of grenadiers

had already gotten wind

of what the British were up to,

and stormed the gates.

They moved too late--Huelhe and his men had
away.

already sailed

According to Jose Rodriguez, they had set

fire to

the stores, spiked the cannon, and stolen all the weapons
and ammunition in the fort. 2 5
But there are several versions of the actual battle.
Ca s ta ne d a

s t at es

t

hat

Ga l v e z wr o t e t o Bene Hu e l he t o

surrender,

then

refusai. 26

Rubio Sanchez has Galvez' version:

unsuccessfully
request,

forced

him

negotiating

out

with

after

the

latter's
after

the British--at their

wri tea Mencos Franco--he surprised and drove the

enemy to their ships on the 30th of November. 2 7

Bancroft
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sa7s the British took several leading men from the village
with them as hostages. 2 8

The following morning,

the 30th

0£ November, Galvez had his men £ix the spiked cannon and
take inventor1 or the fort
£ort7-three cannon,

artiller7.

They still had

including mortars and cul verins:

ten

on the exterior, six on the carenero, five on the land side
bulwarks, seven on the seaside curtains, and fifteen Dn
various other locations. 2 9

No mention is

made

or the

British sacking the fort or damaging anything other than
the spiked cannon and wounded pride or the Spanish.
Rubio &inchez writes of several references recognizing
bravery during the episode:

Felipe de Gallegos,

on

September 22, 1780, £or leading the troops digging trenches
while under £ire;

Francisco Aybar,

on September 26,

a

sergeant major from Comayagua, who held 0££ the British,
not allowing them to retreat or use the Omoa river to
restock their provisions;
the 24th of November,

Antonio Esguardi,

1781,

£or valor in battle.30

Audiencia gave promotions to:
Colonel;

infantry,

Fernando de Porras,

on
The
to

Captain Felix Dom!nguez, to Lieutenant-Colonel;

Fran c i s c o Tr o n c o s o ,

Lui a

Mend e z de

S o t o ma yo r ,

Mi g u e 1

Hermosilla, and Ventura Galvan, to Captain.
News of Galvez
capital.

1

recapture of Omoa soon reached the

On the seventh of December a proclamation was

issued, declaring that:
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a. ma.as be said and a Te Deum sung in thanks for
the happy restoration of the port of Omoa,
executed the 28th of November, 1779, leaving as
fugitives t~e garrison from England at seven
that night.3
For his efforts,

the Audiencia promoted Brigadier

Matias de Galvez to Field Marshall.
hand,

Desnaux, on the other

stood trial for having surrendered the fort.

defense showed who really was at fault:

His

there had been

almost no powder or ammunition when he took charge.

He had

accepted the position on the promises of Galvez to support
and supp 1 y wha t e v er h e n e e d e d •
not keep;
ignored,
filled,

Th e a e pr o mi s e s Ga 1 v e z d id

a request for powder and shot made August 18 was
as were several subsequent orders.

Desnaux probably could have

Moreover,

unknowingly of course,

Had they been

repulsed the British.

he had only been allowed

one month in which to prepare for the attack.
I went to the Fort of Omoa to take charge of
its command persuaded of the effectiveness of
the order issued to the squadron of Dragoons of
Guatemala and two companies of militias from
Comayagua to reinforce tthe fort). In addition
to these guarantees I would have the powder
necessary to defend myself, all offered me by
the president; but the 2d expedition of the
British arrived first.3 2
Desnaux wrote to Drez Navarro that
Little would it have served me to deny total
capitulaton and remain obstinate in the
defense, because this cannot be obtained while
the fort is not finished, not properly manned,
without powder or arms • • • • It was
not
possible for Omoa. to be defended without aid,
nor do I consider it possible that the G~neral
[GalvezJ could have sent what we needed.3j
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Desnaux made several suggestions for improvements.
The assault proved that without the exterior earthworks (or
at

least

itself1

completed

works) the

fort

could not

defend

English soldiers had even taken cover in the old

arms plaza or San Francisco.

All tall buildings, trees, or

structures should be removed from within the fort's cannon
range.

Other

weaknesses

included

the

unfinished

counterscape, the unfinished gun emplacements,
landfills, etc.

bulwark

The town should be moved to the top of the

hill, if only for health reasons:

the swamps and mangroves

still had not been controlled.34
Ga 1 v e z ,

i mp r e s s e d w it h De e n au z ' de re n s e , a pp a r en t 1 y

also agreed with many or suggestions.

But he spent more

energy on an aggressive pursuit of the British, arguing
that until the British had been eradicated from the
Caribbean islands, the north coast of Honduras could not be
safe, even if a coastguard force worked there.
Everything verifies more the necessity in which
are found these stopping points of Honduras, for
throwing out the English from the island of
Jamaica, to free them from their piracies, and
of the unmeasured hel~ they give to the indian
barbarians against us. 5
'

Galvez' rhetoric supported an offensive posture for
Omoa, but he apparently meant an infantry challenge to the
British forces, not a naval force.

He, along with all the

other governmental leaders in Guatemala,

could not decide

the purpose £or which the fort at Omoa had been built.

Chapter Elevens

1

Britain e

attacks

on

The Fiasco

Omoa during

the

war

in

1779

appear in reality to have been merely a diversion to draw
Spain's attention away from a major thrust toward Lake
Nicaragua. 1

. Unfortunately

for

the

British,

these

diversions actually ended up in a victory for Spain, and
Nicaragua did not even suffer a small raid. 2
war,

After the

Spain requested negotiations for the return of

Gibraltar:
Irish

the . Spanish minister in London talked with an

ecclesiastic,

Cumberland.

Mr.

Hussey,

and

later

with

a

Mr.

In return for Gibraltar, Spain promised to

cede San Fernando de Omoa, Puerto Rico,

lands in Oran, and

to abrogate the treaty with France.

Spain would also ally

herself with England against the

American insurgents,

confirm the Treaty . of Paris
indemnities

of

1763,

for any destroyed English

and to pay heavy
property.3

England

declined the offer.
In actuality, neither Omoa nor Trujillo had been very
effective in ending the smuggling or the piracy among the
Spanish and British seamen.

Part of the reason why the

forts did not stop aliens or corsairs from making off with
the riches of the Spanish Crown appears to have been the
same Spaniards who supposedly defended these riches.
often helped

to

pillage

the
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They

Royal Treasury--as in the

138

Commander Palma case, for instance. But when it came to an
actual invasion or the colonies, the projects to take by
force

these

lands

from

Spain

generally

failed.Ji

San

Fernando de Omoa fell not through the fault of the Spanish
military,
because

or that or the fort itself solely, but rather
of

the

system

that

built

Spa.in

it.

had

overextended both in resources and organization, and its
enemies

proved

too

strong for

her

to

underdeveloped and sparsely inhabited.
seemed to help the Spanish Empire:

hold an
But its

area

so

sheer size

that may be one of the

reasons why the fort at Omoa was not permanently lost to
Galvez saved the fort's

the British.
recovering
abandoned,

it.

But

without

it

the

inspectors recommended.

was

then

honor at arms by

left,

improvements

its

practically
builders

and

In a way, Omoa reflected the rest

or the many American fortifications,

weak only by belonging

to the most dilapidated system of defense ever erected.
That system had been built by an empire exhausted, drained
by its own effort to expand,

but i t s t i l l withstood

constantly the moat hardened attacks by Spain's enemies
throughout
analysis

or

the
the

Caribbean.5

As

Vel~zquez

significance and

Spanish colonial defense system,

states in her

effectiveness

of

the

through reviewing the

history of this system there can be no doubt about the
sharp insight of the Spaniards or the sixteenth century as
they sought strategic places on the coasts of America.6
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works),
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fort
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the

unfinished
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hill, if only for health reasons:

the swamps and mangroves

still had not been oontrolled.34
Galvez

apparently

suggestions.

agreed

with

many

of

Desnaux'

But he spent more energy on an aggressive

pursuit or the British,

arguing that until the British had

been eradicated from the Caribbean islands, the north coast
of Honduras could not be safe, even if a coastguard force
worked there.
Everything verifies more the necessity in which
are found these stopping points of Honduras, for
throwing out the English from the island of
Jamaica, to free them from their piracies, and
of the unmeasured hel~ they give to the indian
barbarians against us. 5
Galvez' rhetoric supported an offensive posture for
Omoa, but he apparently meant an infantry challenge to the
British forces,

not a naval force.

He, along with all the

other governmental leaders in Guatemala,

could not decide

the purpose for which the fort at Omoa had been built.

Chapter Elevens

Britain's

attacks

The Fiasco

on Omoa during the

war

1779

in

appear in reality to have been merely a diversion to draw
Spain's attention away from a
Nicaragua. 1

Unfortunately

major thrust toward Lake
for

the

British,

these

diversions actually ended up in a victory for Spa.in, and
Nicaragua did not even suffer a small raid. 2
war,

After the

Spa.in requested negotiations for the return of

Gi bra.l tar:
Irish

the Spanish minister in London talked with an

ecclesiastic,

Cumberland.

Mr.

Hussey,

the treaty with France.
England against
of

later

with

a

Mr.

In return for Gibraltar, Spain promised to

cede San Fernando de Omoa,

treaty

and

the

Paris,

and

Puerto Rico,

Spain would also ally herself with
American insurgents,
pay

heavy

destroyed English property.3
In actuality,

lands in Oran, and

confirm

indemnities

for

the
any

England declined the offer.

neither Omoa nor Trujillo had been very

effective in ending the smuggling or the piracy among the
Spanish and British seamen.

Pa.rt of the reason why the

forts did not stop aliens or corsairs from making off with
the riches of the Spanish Crown appears to have been the
same Spaniards who supposedly defended these riches.

They

often helped to pillage the Royal Treaaury--as in the Palma
case, for instance. But when it came to an actual invasion
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of the

colonies~

the projects to take by force these lands

from Spain generally failed.4

San Fernando de Omoa fell

not through the fault of the Spanish military, or that of
the fort itself solely, but rather because of the system
that built it.

Spain had overextended both in resources

and organization, and its enemies proved too strong for her
to hold an area so underdeveloped and sparsely inhabited.
But its sheer size seemed to help the Spanish Empire:

that

may be one of the reasons why the fort at Omoa was not
p er man en t 1 y 1 o a t t o t h e Br i t i s h.

Ga 1 v e z a av e d t h e f or t 's

honor at arms by recovering it.

But it was then left,

practically abandoned,
builders

without the improvements its

and inspectors

recommended.

In a

way,

Omo a

reflected the rest of the many American fortifications,
weak only by belonging to the most dilapidated system of
defense ever erected.

That system had been built by an

empire exhausted, drained by its own effort to expand, but
it still withstood constantly the most hardened attacks by
Spain's enemies throughout the Caribbean.5
states

in

her

effectiveness

analysis

of

of

the Spanish

the

As Velazquez

significance

and

colonial defense system,

through reviewing the history of this system there can be
no doubt about the sharp insight of the Spaniards of the
sixteenth century as they sought strategic places on the
coasts of America.6
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Why did the Omoa project not

become one of the

outstanding examples of this excellent defense system?

It

had everything going for it--a good bay, ease of defense, a
location close to all the Central American trouble spots.
The trouble stemmed from the lack or military organization
at the higher levels of government.

No consistent line of

authority appears to have been set down for the planning
and execution of the blueprints for San Fernando de Omoa.
Anyone in the Audiencia or the Council of the Indies could
and

did

alter

anything

they

wanted

to.

The

original

concept called for an offensive garrison to outfit royal
corsairs and fleets
forces.

The Viceroy Duke of the Palata first came up with

the idea,
the

to combat pirates and enemy naval

which apparently Aranda and D!ez used throughout

entire

planning and construction stages.

quotes the royal
fortification

c~dula

of August 30,

Bancroft

1740, ordering the

of Omoa "as a further protection for the

coasts of Honduras, and to serve as a calling-place for the
coast

guards

for

these

parts," to

show

its

planned

benefits.7
Right from the start Luis Drez Navarro had stated his
theory behind the planning of the fort:
It seems more to our purpose to build a fort in
this port and not at Trujillo for several
reasons, one of which is that two galeotas or
pirogues could be based there as corsairs to
capture as many ships as the English send to
Valis
Belize
to load dyewood.
The latter
still persist in dealing in the above mentioned
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port or Trujillo, and the Spanish corsairs
could continue to interrupt these incur'Sionsa
all this is the reason for this proposal.
During the construction, however, the mentality or the
administration in Guatemala changed enough to undermine the
purpose tor the use or the tort.

passive defense became or paramount

longer held sways
importance.

The equipment and personnel sent to Omoa

reflected this.
Omoa;

Active aggression no

No fleet received orders to operate from

only merchant ships used the port, except for an

occasional military vessel docking for supplies.
This drastic change in the intent of the fort brought
about its demise.

In 1779 the Spaniards had to use a half-

completed offensive fort in a defensive posture with rather
predictable

results.

Had either

concept

been used

consistently, it would have worked, as both had advantages.
But either had to be

implemented fully,

of Spain's economic conditions.
for the wrong reason.

within the limits

Spain built the wrong fort

It needed not to defend the area

from invaders, but rather to police against illegal trade
with its own colonists.

A police force meant going out and

stopping the smugglers, not scaring them off with a show of
strength.

Accusations like Antonio Porta's that Omoa could

not stop smuggling even in the nearby areas or Chamelec6n
and Ulua rivers were true,
been built in Omoa..

if only because the fort had

Had it been assigned a fleet or ships

to patrol the coasts, Omoa could have stopped, or at least

14)

checked,

the rampant smuggling.

But the fleet was never

assigned,

so the smuggling continued.

Perhaps the cost factor had something to do with its
the fort took so long to build because or the many things
going against it--unsanitary conditions, low priority, lack
or adequate personnel--that the officials in Spain tired of
throwing money at it.

Because for so long commerce had

been prohibited through Honduras,

the colonists had

established illegal lines of trade, making it impossible
for the local government to collect enough taxes to pay for
the project.

Officials in Spain did not see much need for

an expensive fort in a low-profit area, as can be seen in
Arriaga's letter to Salazar,

which showed that the Council

wanted to finish the fort only to avoid admitting having
wasted its money.9
The longer it took to build the fort, the longer it
would take to establish commerce enough to pay for the
fort.

But Spain could not afford that much time or money

in one lump sum.

Neither could it afford to operate an

offensive or a large enough defensive fort in the Central
American provinces in the mid-1700's.
been altered,

paving

the

way

for a

defensive system of the colonies.

So the plans had
major flaw

in the

By building the fort,

Spain attracted the attention of the British military, like
an invitation to attack.

The fort had not been built for
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that kind of attackf

it needed a

complete its defenses.

squadron of ships to

For this reason San Fernando de

Omoa fell so easily to Dalrymple and Suttrell in 17791

the

resistance put up by the Spaniards from a poorly equipped
and unfinished fort could not meet an enemy force of equal
strength, for no ships defended the bay in concert with the
fort.

io
So the vast amount of lives and money spent on the

construction of Omoa came to naught.

Without counting the

slight possibility of some deterrence earlier on in the
project,

Omoa became

a

fiasco,

a

monument

to

Spain's

cumbersome government and lack of an effective, consistent
defense policy.
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2 5Fern!ndez de Medrano, El Arquitecto Perfecto en el
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1983.
31.23 exp 39450 leg 4587 fol 20v, AGCA, Guatemala, in
Argueta, p. 22.
4The group came from the towns or La Campa, Coloete,
Colueuoa,
Caiqu!n, Erandique,
Guajatique, Gualciene,
Joconguera, Lepaera, Malutena, Gualmoaca, Piraera and
Guarcha. A3.12 (ll) exp 5300 AGCA, Guatemala, in Ibid.
5A41.22 exp 5071 leg 215, AGCA, Guatemala,· in Ibid., p.
23.
6 1nterview with V!ctor Cruz Reyes, Historical Research
Director, Instituto Hondureno de Antropolog!a e Historia
(IHAH), Tegucigalpa, Honduras, March 23, 1983.
1 A3.12 exp 1883 leg 186, AGCA, Guatemala, in Argueta,
p.

2 3.

8 Ibid.
9 A3.12

(4) exp 5300 leg 509,

AGCA, Guatemala,

in Ibid.

10 Joee Maria Tojeira,
Los Hioaques de
(Tegucigalpa, Honduras:
Guaymuros, 1982), p. 18.

Yoro

11 A1.14 exp 644 leg 56, AGCA, Guatemala, in Argueta, p.
23.
12 A3 exp 13273 leg 709, AGCA, Guatemala, in Ibid.
1 3Ibid.

l4Ibid., P• 2-4.
15 Ibid., p. 30.
16 Harvey K. Meyer, Historical Dictionary of Honduras,
Latin American Historical Dictionaries, 41-13 (Metuchen,
N.J.a
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1976), p. 168.

157

17"Documents pending concerning the purchase or one
hundred blacks, ror the Port of Omoa, on account or his
majesty, b7 which a deal was made with don Gaspar Holl
Neighbor of Jama7oa.
or rice of Guerra Guti~rrez."
Rubio,
"Historia," pp. 651-652.
1 8Ibid., pp. 652-654.
1 9A2.3 exp 2019 leg 102, AGCA,

with V!ctor Cruz Reyes,
211,
1983.

IHAH,

GuatemalaJ
interview
Tegucigalpa, Honduras, March

20A2.3 exp 2019 leg 102, AGCA, Guatemala, in Rubio,
"Historia," p. 131.
Rubio does not explain how long the
pay period was, though it seems logical to assume it was
one month.
21 Ibid.,
P· 1 4-4.
22 Ibid.,

P•

2 3zapatero,

158.
"Estudio Asesor," P•

61.

2 l1Bancroft, v.
2' P• 645.

2 5zapatero,

"Estudio Asesor," p.

160.

26Interview with Victor Cruz Reyes,
Honduras, March 24, 1983.

IHAH,

Tegucigalpa,
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gives the
following figures for the population of
Guatemala by provinces at the end or the 18th oenturys
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Nicaragua
Costa Rica
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Sacatepequez
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2.IJ '68.11
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52,423
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68,930
30,000
58,450
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72,786
833,196 '

Bancroft,· vol. 3, p. 613, official Doc., 1 January, 1886,
set the population at 1,322,544; Guatemalan Mem. Sec.
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Scale
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Profiles." Sign 5.1721
p-b-11-11 hoja 7a, Serv. Hist. Mil.
Madrid, in Zapatero, "Estudio Asesor," p. 117.
2 9Minuta. al Presid.te de la R.1 Audiencia. de Guatemala..
25 Marzo 1757," sign Guatemala. 874, AGI, Sevilla., in
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3 1 Ibid., p. 31, law VI, 1593.
3 2 Ibid., pp. 30-32, laws XII, XIII.
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34Ibid.
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3calde:r0n Quijano,
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128-129.

4"Plan of the Fort which is being constructed for the
protection of the Port of San Fernando de Omoa according to
the State in which it is found on this date.
Omoa 28 of
April of 1769." Antonio de Murga Sign 5.1721
P-b-11-11,
hoja lla, Serv. Hist. Mil. Madrid, in Zapatero, "Estudio
Asesor," pp. 138-139.
5Arriaga to Salazar 28-IV-770, AGI Guatemala 877, in
Rubio, "Historia," p. 144.
6A1.23 leg 1541 fol.

26,

AGCA,
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7A3.1 exp 12975 leg 689 fol 49, AGCA, Guatemala.
8 "Castillo de San Fernando de Omoa.
Brass Cannons1
of 24 caliber, mounted, 6 good1
of 12, 2 goodJ of JI
mounted, 11;
of 12 mounted, 8 goodJ
of 6 mounted, one
good one,
or 4 mounted, one good one1
or 3 mounted, 3
goodJ
of 2 unmounted, 4 good;
of one mounted, two good.
Catapults or one pound, one hundred good.
There follow
scoops on poles for all oalibers1
sponges, pincers and
scrapers on poles, the same.
Cord, 54 mozos.
Smooth
bullets or brass or 18, one hundred and twent7-two1
or ~'
three hundred and sixty-siXJ
of one, one hundred and
fifteen. Smooth bullets or iron of 24, eight hundred and
ninetyJ
of this same . tenor or 18, 12, and 6 in proportion,
of ~. one thousand five hundred, and 50 of 3, of 2, and 1.
Buckshot in sacks or 24 to 12, 8, 6, and lit
and besides
120 arrobas or loose. Palanquete~ or 18, one hundre~ and
ninety-two. 0£ 12, six hundred and eight. Muskets, 200
good, 395 medium, and 751 useless;
bayonets, pikes and
lances in proportion1 pistols, 151 useless;
swords, 102
good and 20 useless.
There follow flints, cartridge
mounters and scrapers, medium.
Hand grenades, 480 medium.
Molds to pour bullets, 14 medium, and 278 flats or lead.
Cartridges for muskets, Ji,500 good;
bullets, 142 arrobas,
and powder, 338 quintales at four arrobas per quintal •
Tools, hoes, pokers, adzes, saws, hatchets, machetes in
quantity.
Looks, cauldrons, bars, sledge hammers, dies in
p r op or t i on , s q u are and 1 eve 1. .. Garo! a P e la e z , p • 6 9 •
9 Gar c! a P e la e z , p. 7 3 •
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F. r
D. n Ju 1 ia n d e Arriaga. Gu at e ma 1 a , 1 d e Mar z o 1 7 7 1 , "
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11"Plans for the Fort that is being constructed for the
defense or this port or San Fernando de Omoa, on the coast
or H.o nduras, according to the condition which on this da7
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Omoa 28 of August of 1772.
Antonio de
Murga." Sign 5.1721 P-b-11-11, hoja 2a, Serv. Hist. Mil.
Madrid, in Ibid., p. 1JJ6.
12 Ibid., p. 149.
1 3A3.1 leg 18 exp 157, AGCA, Guatemala.
14"Plans for the Fort that is being constructed for the
defense of the Port of San Fernando de Omoa on the Coast of
Honduras according to the condition it is in on this day.
San Fernando de Omoa and May 12 of 1773.
Joa~ Gonzalez
Ferminor." Sign Guatemala 194--according to the "Ca~logo"
or Torres Lanzas, AGI, Sevilla, in Zapatero, "Estudio
Asesor," p. 153.
15 Ibid., p. 154.
l6"Plans for the Fort being built for the defense of
this Port of San Fernando de Omoa on the Coast of Honduras
according to the condition in which today is round the
works. S.n Fernando de Omoa, and Dec.re 25 or 1774. Jph.
Gonzalez Ferminor.
Is a copy or the original.
New
Establishment 1st or February of 1775.
Navarro."
Sign
Ma.pas y Planos, Guatemala, 149, AG! Sevilla, in Ibid., pp.
155-156.
17 Ibid., p. 155.
18 This is apparently a regionalism which literally
means "with the cannon at three threads."
1 9 Ca l d e r6 n Q u i j an o , " E l F u e r t e , " p • 1 3 2 •

20 Escrito del Presid.te de la R.l Audiencia de
Gu at e ma 1 a , a 1 min i s t r o d e I n d 1 as , Bay 1 i o Fr • D. Ju 1 ia n de
Arriaga.
6 de enero 1775," sign Guatemala 462, AGI
Sevilla, in Zapatero, "Estudio Asesor," p. 157.
2 1 " Cart a d e May o r g a a Gal v e z , " d at e d 5 - 4 - 7 7 7 , s i g n
Gu a t e mal a f i 1 e 8 7 8 , AG I , 1 n Ca 1 d e r6 n Qui j an o , "E 1 Fu er t e , "
p.

133.
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2 2 A3.1 exp 22; 189 leg 1294 fol 18, AGCA, Guatemala.
23np1a.ns of the town and Fort of San Fernando de
Omoa.," Secc. Cartografica sign 147.
Earl7 1775, a.non.,
Biblioteca Na.ciona.l, Madrid, in Zapatero, "Estudido
Asesor," P. 160.
2llculebrina.s were small, ancient portable cannon,
similar to the British culverins.
Escrito del Presidente
de la R.l Audienoia. de Guatemala..
4 de Ma70, 1777, ref
Gua.t. 878. AGI Seville, in Ibid., P• 161.
25The route was as follows1
Guatemala City to Hacienda
San Miguel, 1 1/2 leagues, to Pueblo de los Arcos, 3 3/4
leagues,
to Cuajinicuilapa, 2 3141
to Sacualpa., 3 3/41
to Justiapa, 4 3/4J
to Santa Catalina, 3 1121
to Hacienda
Agua Blanca, 1 league 2 1/2J to Hacienda Piedras Gordas,
3;
to Esquipulas, Ji;
to Hacienda Sant!simo Cristo, 1
league 1 1/21
to Hacienda Tupilango, 2 3/4;
to Copan, 2
31111
to Vents. de Cop(n, 141
the trip then went around the
Si e r r a de Co pan , th r o ugh t he t o w n s or Q u i mi a tan , San ta
Cruz, Magdalena, San Pedro Sula, and to San Fernando de
Omoa..
Zapatero, "Estudido Asesor," pp. 16JJ-171.
2 6 11 Plan of defense for the Fort of San Fernando de Omoa
made by Order or the King by the Brigadier of Ynfa.ntr7 Don
Agust!n Crame in accordance with the Colonel of Militias
don Antonio F~rrandiz, Commandant interim or said Fort.
San Fernando de Omoa at 17 of April of 1779.
Agustrn Ora.me
and Antonio Ferrandiz." Serv. Hist. Mil. Madrid, in Ibid.,
PP• 172-80.
2 7Ibid.
28 Ibid.
2 9A2.5 exp 687 leg 50, AGCA, Guatemala.
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